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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In 1969 Carl Rogers published Freedom to Learn , and,
in a matter of weeks, the book's central theses had become
the subject of rather heated educational debate. The moment
was certainly propitious, for one suspects that had the
book been published ten or fifteen years earlier, it would
have fallen stillborn from the press? few educators would
have read it, and those who did might well have dismissed
it as nonsense, or as the remnant of a decadent progress-
ivism. By 1969
,
however, a number of educational critics
—
Holt, Goodman, Kozol, and Friedenberg among them—had al-
ready written scathing criticisms of the public schools, and,
what is perhaps of greater import, the writings of these
"new critics" had unprecedented broad-based appeal. Many
teachers and students found in these writings confirmation
of that which they had suspected all along—that too many
schools were wretched places in which to learn and work.
Unlike the works of Holt, Goodman, Kozol, & Co., however,
Freedom to Learn is not essentially a critical work, and,
to the extent that it is, it must be regarded as a rather un-
inspired effort. Indeed, it is interesting that in a decade
of turbulence and upheaval Rogers chooses to ignore political
and economic concerns altogether, and educational institu-
tions receive only superficial consideration. To a large
1
2extent we might attribute that fact to Rogers' experience
as a clinician, but it may well be that he has different
purposes in mind. Specifically, it would seem that he is
primarily interested in building an educational theory on
a foundation of certain psychotherapeutic suppositions.
Perhaps it would be unfair to call Freedom to Learn a
"methods book," but it is more that than anything else.
In part, then, the appeal of Freedom to Learn is its
specificity. At a time when other writers were telling
us that something had to be done, Regers was engaged in the
more dangerous process of attempting to tell us how to do
that which had to be done. It is not surprising, therefore,
that educators, in a desperate search for viable alternatives
and theoretical justifications, should turn to someone like
Carl Rogers for guidance. It is not surprising because
Rogers and his colleagues had focused their attention on a
major concern of the educational reformersi the improvement
of interpersonal relations, and the enhancement of personal
growth.
It is also quite possible that Rogers' works have
attracted attention for quasi-philosophical reasons—notably
as a result of his frequent allusions to Kierkegaard and
Existential philosophy. This is difficult to substantiate,
but it seems reasonable to assert that on the college campus
of the Sixties no philosophical movement provoked as much
3interest and discussion as did this one. That the generation
which popularized the shibboleth "Do your own thing,” should
take an interest in a basically subjectivist philosophy seems,
in retrospect, quite appropriate. In any event, it is diffi-
cult not to believe that to some degree the popularity of
Freedom to Learn rested on its author's explicit acknowledge-
ment of his indebtedness to certain Existentialist philo-
sophers.
In addition to the reasons cited above for the populari-
ty of Freedom to Learn , we should be remiss if we did not
take note of the fact that by 1969 the "encounter group,”
”t-group,” and "sensitivity group" were at the peak of their
popularity. A number of colleges and universities were
actively experimenting with these techniques, and there was
considerable interest in the kinds of learning they purported
to produce. Rogers, of course, had already established him-
self as one of the leading authorities in the field. In
fact, Freedom to Learn is, at least in part, an attempt to
extol the virtues of an educational program based on encounter
groups
.
For all its appeal, however, Freedom to Learn suffers
from some serious weaknesses, and not least among these is
its lack of continuity. The book is after all something of
a "patch job”—several of its chapters having been culled
from earlier publications. The result is a book that lacks
focus, and this, in turn, results in a book that lacks
4logical coherence. Themes appear and disappear with alarming
irregularity, definitions are stipulated without justification,
and many important concepts are not clearly defined. As a
consequence, Freedom to Learn is a book which all but defies
analysis, a paradigm of obfuscation and question begging. In-
terpretations abound! Rogers is alternately characterized
as an Existentialist, a pragmatist, a mystic, and even as a
closet Behaviorist. Apparently there is something for
everybody in the book.
It is this observation which serves as the departure
point for this study. And, in this regard, two questions
are of paramount importance. First, is Rogers* position
internally consistent? Do his arguments logically follow
one from the other? Second, are all important concepts and
definitions tenable? Can they stand up to logical analysis?
To answer these questions, we must set for ourselves the task
of first identifying those concepts and definitions which
seem to be of particular import. For our purposes the concepts
of "knowing," "self," "freedom," and "education" would seem
to be most significant. The first, because no educational
theory would be complete without some understanding of what
it means to know. The second, because, as we noted earlier,
Rogers is deeply concerned over the problem of identity and
personal growth. The third, because it is related to the
problem of restraint and responsibility in education. The
last, because we have an abiding interest in quality education.
5That which follows is intended to serve both as a
guide to the over-all structure of this dissertation, and
as a summary of the scope and intent of each chapter. The
reader should keep in mind that each side heading corresponds
to a subsequent chapter title.
Knowing * At Rice University in 1963, Carl Rogers de-
livered a paper entitled "Toward a Science of the Person,"
wherein he posited the argument that there are three dis-
tinct ways of knowing* "objective," "subjective," and
"interpersonal." Of the three, he claimed, subjective know-
ing is pre-eminent—it serves as the base upon which the other
two modes of knowing rest. The distinction is maintained on
the basis of the definition that "All knowing consists
essentially of hypotheses, which we check in different ways."*
The question, of course, is whether or not such a definition
can do the work which Rogers would have it do? The point is
not as clear-cut as Rogers would have us believe. It is not,
for example, altogether obvious that knowing and hypothesizing
are one and tho same. In addition, the distinction being
made--that there are three ways of knowing—may be excessively
simplistic. The complexity of the knowing process itself may
preclude this type of reductionism.
These, then, are the important questions which we must
consider in the next chapter ; and, though narrowly focused,
our inquiry should cast some light on the broader philo-
sophical bias which pervades Rogers* work.
6Self. The key concept in "Chapter Three" is the "self,"
and it is, I believe, the basic link between Rogers' psycho-
logical theory and his educational theory. It is, however,
a troublesome concept. Primarily because in certain philo-
sophical circles there is some question as to whether or not
its use can be justified at all. This question has, in turn,
prompted some psychologists, most notably the behaviorists
and neo-behaviorists
,
to argue that the self is a superfluous
concept at best, and that its continued use only serves to
impede the process of inquiry. Of paramount concern is the
fact that the concept of self carries with it some rather
tainted connotations. Foremost among these is the suggestion
that the self, like the will and the soul, is ultimately re-
sponsible for the behaviors of a human being. When employed
in this way, of course, the word possesses a decidedly teleo-
logical character, and, insofar as it does, it only serves
to beg the question.
Whether Carl Rogers would consciously subscribe to this
view is not totally clear. In some instances he describes
the self as a phenomenal by-product of social transaction! in
others as a driving organismic force which is essentially
positive in nature. This confusion makes both explication
and analysis exceedingly difficult, and points to inconsis-
tencies which are capable of yielding potentially dangerous
conclusions.
7
Our task, then, is to focus our inquiry on this issue,
and, further, to consider Rogers* distinction between the
"real self” and "introjected selves." This latter distintion
is difficult to summarize, but, in effect, Rogers appears
to be arguing that those selves which arise in social experi-
ence are little more than a facade, that there is in fact a
self which is indigenous to the human organism and capable
of guiding it. It is, of course, this stipulated, non-con-
textual concept of self which gives rise to the charge of
question begging.
Freedjom. Of all the concepts employed by Rogers, none
is so pervasive as this one. It is difficult to find a
chapter in Rogers 1 work where the subject of freedom is not
broached. Certainly, in his educational writings no single
concept is mere important. It is also, however, the concept
with which he has the most trouble; for it pulls him in two
quite different directions. On the one hand, developments
in the behavioral sciences compel him to acknowledge the ease
with which man can be controlled; whereas, on the other, his
own personal, subjectivist bias prevents him from surrendering
to the idea that all of man's actions are determined. The
result is the Rogerian paradox—made manifest in the proposi-
tion that man is simultaneously both autonomous and determined.
It is this paradox which serves as the focus for the chapter.
Our intention is to demonstrate that the paradox is
spurious because it is predicated on two entirely different
8definitions of freedom. The first holding that man is free
because he is responsible; the second that he is responsible
because he is free. The former view is wholly consistent
with deterministic thinking, the latter is not. For his
part Rogers accepts the contradiction, but clearly there is
something wrong with this. Since two mutually exclusive
propositions are involved, one of them must be incorrect.
What is of even greater import, however, is that the
problem can be avoided by taking note of the fact that Rogers
really has no need of a non-deterministic concept of freedom.
His fear that a determined man cannot be considered responsible
for his actions is totally unfounded. Determinism does not,
as is often thought, preclude responsibility.
Education
. In the concluding chapter we shall, as was
previously noted, consider Carl Rogers* educational views in
the light of our analysis of the concepts of "knowing," "self,”
and "freedom." To this end we shall essentially focus our
inquiry on the relationships which exist between these con-
cepts and the concepts "teaching," "learning," "commitment,"
and "the fully functioning person." Some of the more inter-
esting arguments to be considered are*
a) "Anything that can be taught to another is
relatively inconsequential and has little or
no significant influence on behavior. 2
b) "Teaching seems to cause the individual to
distrust his own experience, and to stifle
significant learning." 3
9
c) We ought to do away with teaching.**
d) “The only learning which significantly in-fluences behavior is self
-discovered, self-
appropriated learning." 5
And, perhaps the most interesting statement of alii
e) "Here then is my theoretical model of the
person who emerges from therany or from thebest of education, the individual who has ex-
perienced optimal psychological growth—
a
person functioning freely in all the fullness
of his organismic potentialities? a person wno
is dependable in being realistic, self-enhancing,
socialized, and appropriate in his behavior; a
creative person, whose specific formings of
behavior are not easily predictable; a person
who is ever-changing, ever developing, always
discovering himself and the newness in himself
in each succeeding moment of time." 6
Each of the above suppositions is grounded to a
greater or lesser extent in the three concepts that we have
briefly considered. The questions that remain arei Do
the concepts in question adequately support Rogers* arguments?
And, would an alternative conceptual scheme prove to be more
efficacious?
An alternative view
. The last question above turns our
attention toward what some might consider to be the more
positive dimension of this study—the positing of an alterna-
tive viewpoint. In this regard several things need be said.
First, that while such an alternative is presented in the
study, it is by no means as fully comprehensive as it might
be. There are several reasons why this is the case—the
most important being that this work maintains throughout a
critical focus; its primary purpose is clarification, not
10
proselytism. However, it would be foolhardy to argue that an
intellectual bias of some sort or another does not exist in
the work. The frequent references to Dewey, Mead, and James
would belie any such claim. Nevertheless, to the extent
that a bias does permeate this work, it does so as a function
of an essentially critical posture, as an instrument of analy-
sis, or as a means whereby an alternative viewpoint may be
illustrated. At this point in time a comprehensive elabora-
tion of Instrumentalist thinking would constitute an unnec-
essary redundancy.
The one possible exception to this may be the explica-
tion of George Herbert Mead's conception of self in Chapter
Three. The justification for his presence therein is two-
fold. On the one hand, the juxtaposition of Rogers' and
Mead's conceptions of self makes for a most interesting con-
trast, and further clarifies the shortcomings inherent in
Rogers' position. On the other, there is this author's per-
sonal opinion that Mead has much to say to educators, and
that his rich insights into human behavior have been too long
neglected.
A postscript . Four years has now passed since Freedom
to Learn was published. In that time much has happened.
Among other things, Rogers has become educationally respect-
able—the worst fate for an educational reformer—the encounter
group movement has faded into the background, and Existential-
ism has given way to Mysticism. In short, Freedom to Learn
11
has become something of a relic; its concern for self-enhance-
ment, and personal commitment has given way to discussions of
accountability and competency. In light of this, it would
almost seem that this study is really unwarranted. This, I
believe, is not the case; for in spite of the trends and
fads of the moment, the basic concerns remain relatively
constant. Freedom will always be an issue in education; we
shall always be concerned with what it means to know something,
and our traditions suggest that the concept of self will not
obligingly disappear as perhaps it ought to. Our only
rational recourse, then, is to submit such meaningful, though
troublesome, concepts to rigorous examination. It is only
in this way that we can be at all certain that our educational
policies and practices rest on defensible premises. The
alternative is mindlessness.
12
FOOTNOTES
Carl Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person," in
T. V/. Wann, ed., gehaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting
£§.ge.s for Modern Psychology
. (Chicago and London* Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1964), p. no.
2Carl Rogers, Freedom to Learn
. (Columbus, Ohio*
Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 152-3.
^Ibid .
.
p. 153.
4Ibid .
. p. 153.
^Ibid
.
.
p. 153.
^Ibid., p. 295.
CHAPTER II
THREE WAYS OF KNOWING
In 1963 Carl Rogers presented a paper entitled "Tow-
ard a Science of the Person" to a group of distinguished
scientists who had gathered together for a symposium at
Rice University. The topic of the symposium was "Behavior-
ism and Phenomenology t Contrasting Bases for Modern Psy-
chology," but many of the papers which were presented,
including Rogers', suggested that the central issue was not
one of "contrast" but of "encompassment , " That is, whether
behaviorism is but a branch of phenomenology, or phenomenology
a branch of behaviorism. Carl Rogers chose to argue for the
former on the grounds that the epistemological base of
phenomenological, or third force, psychology is broader than
the base upon which behaviorism depends. The main points
of his argument can be summarized as follows 1
a) There are three distinct ways of knowing*
"subjective," "objective" and "interpersonal."
These ways of knowing "differ primarily in the
manner in which we check our hypotheses ."
1
b) Any reasonably complete scientific description
of man would, of necessity, employ all three
types of knowing. 2
c) The influence of logical positivism on scientific
inquiry has unnecessarily and undesirably narrowed
the scope of scientific investigation by forcing
scientists to treat only of those things which
are publicly observable. 3
d) Furthermore, positivist-oriented science has ruled
out of consideration "the whole universe of inner
13
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meanings, of purposes, of the inner flow of ex-
perience....” 4
e) And, finally, a more inclusive science would have
to acknowledge that subjective and interpersonal
knowing are as significant and legitimate as is
so-called objective knowing. 5
Taken together, Rogers* arguments do not add up to a
logical whole, but one can clearly see that he is intent
upon providing science, in general, and psychology, in particu-
lar, with as broad an epistemological base as possible.
Unfortunately, some of his lesser arguments are not always
to the point. He charges, for example, that one of the de-
ficiencies of objective knowing is that it stresses public
verification, and its legitimacy is dependent upon a specific
reference group. The reference group may then decide to give
a hearing only to "those who have agreed in advance not to
question the core elements of the structure. The argument
is probably valid, but what, exactly, is it that Rogers is
arguing? Are the roots of the problem epistemological or
ethical? That is, does the fault lie in the manner of know-
ing or does it lie in the reference group? Perhaps the prob-
lem is not subject to such a bifurcation, but looking at it
in this way might lead one to conclude that the limitations
on scientific inquiry lie somewhere other than the principle
of objectivity.
On the other hand, Rogers' epistemological concerns
might be quite legitimate. The parameters of inquiry which
15
presently obtain in the sciences might well be too narrow
to develop a reasonably complete scientific description of
man. Perhaps it would be best if they were expanded. However,
it is not altogether clear that we ought to expand them in
the manner in which Rogers suggests. In fact, there is some
reason to wonder if Rogers' formulations expand them at all.
Is it indeed the case that there are three ways of knowing?
This and related questions occupy the greater portion of this
chapterj and lay the groundwork for the analysis of "self,”
"freedom,” and "education" undertaken in subsequent chapters.
Although most of the analysis is focused on scientific in-
quiry, the reader might wish to keep in mind the fact that
behaviorism and third force psychology do not merely repre-
sent two competing scientific viewpoints, they also represent
two competing educational viewpoints. Moreover, the questions
of how we know, and what it means to know, ought to be of no
less importance to the educator than they are to the scientist
or philosopher.
In the explication which follows I have made every attempt
to represent Rogers' position as accurately as possible; all
comments and criticisms have been withheld to avoid possible
confusion. Analysis follows the completion of the explication.
Subjective knowing . We know subjectively, says Rogers,
when we check our hypotheses "by using the ongoing flow of
n
our preconceptual experience as a referant." Me use it, for
example, whenever we wish to clarify our feelings about some-
16
thing, whenever we attempt to answer such questions as, "Do
I hate him, or is it envy that I am feeling?" Or, to use
another of Rogers* examples, we use it when we sample a new
dish and try to decide whether or not we like it. These are
common, everyday examples of questions to which we seek sub-
jective answers, but more complex tasks also involve this
type of knowing. Rogers writes
i
The person who has tackled a complex new job, or
who is faced with complicated data in research, has
also experienced this same process within himself.
At first his "knowledge" of the task is global, im-
precise, undifferentiated. Then he begins to sense
pattern—that these events or these facts seem to
go together, that these other events or facts, while
they loom large on the surface, are probably not
important. He acts tentatively to test these inner
hypotheses, moving forward when the pattern is sensed
as becoming stronger, or correcting his direction
when his sense of pattern fades. 8
Regarding this last example, Rogers stresses that though ex-
ternal cues and stimuli may be involved in this type of hy-
pothesis formation, it "is our inner experiencing to which we
refer to check and sharpen and further differentiate the
conceptual hypotheses we are forming from the implicit meanings.
He then concludes his remarks on subjective knowing by saying
that when an individual attempts to check his internal hypothe-
sis with others or with his environment, he then passes into
the objective way of knowing. 10
Objective knowing . This type of knowing differs from
subjective knowing insofar as "hypotheses are based upon an
external frame of reference, and the hypotheses are checked
17
both by externally observable operations, and by making
empathetic inferences regarding the reactions of a trusted
reference group." 11 Thus, a behaviorist formulates the
hypothesis that given a certain environmental stimulus, an
animal will emit a certain response. He tests his hypothe-
sis in the laboratory, writes up a research report that will
permit others to duplicate his experiment, and then waits
for confirmation or rejection of his findings. The role of
the reference group is extremely important in this type of
knowing, for the empathy of the knower is directed toward
the reference group and not toward the knower' s inner flow
of experience. Finally, it is important to note that ob-
jective knowing is as fallible as subjective knowing, and it
would be a mistake to think that "objective knowledge is
'out there,' firm, impersonal, and secure." 1 ^
Interpersonal knowing
.
Somewhere between the two types
of knowing already mentioned we find interpersonal knowing
—
"a mode which applies primarily to knowledge of human beings
14
and the higher organisms." Of this manner of knowing
Rogers writes:
These knowings, like those described before, are
all hypotheses. But in these instances the way of
checking these hypotheses is to use whatever skill
and empathetic understanding is at my command to
get at the relevant aspect of your phenomenological
field, to get inside your private world of meanings,
and see whether my understanding is correct, 15
18
Interpersonal knowing may be confirmed in several ways.
It may involve asking the person whose "inner world" you are
attempting to know whether your hypothesis is correct, or
it may involve observing his behavior, or it may require the
creation of a climate in which the person feels that it might
be safe, or even rewarding, to reveal his world of personal
meanings
.
Rogers claims that there are two criteria for a claim
to interpersonal knowledge; "either my hypotheses about the
internal frame of reference of this individual is confirmed
by the individual himself or the inferences made about his
internal frame of reference are confirmed by a consensual
validation." Thus, if I have a friend who seems to be de-
pressed, I might test my hypothesis by asking him if it is
correct, or I might consult with other friends to see if
they have formed similar hypotheses. From the therapist *s
point of view, this mode of knowing provides "scientific
leverage in getting at the non-observable events which go
on within the individual
.
Analysis
.
Although Rogers speaks of three distinctly
different modes of knowing, some uniform criteria of what it
means to know something must exist. Otherwise it would make
little sense to employ a single concept to refer to three
completely different activities. What, then, do the three
ways of knowing have in common with each other ? One answer
with which Rogers supplies us is that "All knowing consists
19
essentially of hypotheses, which we check in different ways."'*'®
This definition is helpful* but it is also somewhat ambiguous.
Are we to understand Rogers to be saying that we know some-
thing when we have formulated a hypothesis, or do we know
only when we have formed a hypothesis and then checked it in
some way? The evidence, by and large, seems to support the
former view. At one point Rogers says, "Sometimes we endeav-
or to divide such hypotheses as I have given, such examples
of knowing, into objective and subjective knowledge." 1 ^ And
later, in his explication of interpersonal knowing, he adds,
"These knowings, like those described before, are all hypothe-
20
ses," These quotations do, indeed, suggest that Rogers
equates knowing with the formation of hypotheses. In light
of this, our proper task is to consider whether or not that
formulation is tenable, and we might best begin by focusing
our attention on the criteria which distinguish hypothetical
statements from sentences of a different sort.
I believe that it is safe to begin by arguing that all
hypotheses posit a claim of one sort or another, they avow
that something is the case. (It is going to rain tonight.
Socrates is mortal, v = 32t.) Moreover, inasmuch as all
hypotheses entail a claim to know something, they also entail
the possibility of being incorrect. (It might not rain to-
night. Socrates might not be mortal, v ^ 32t.) The fact
that hypotheses may be incorrect presents us with an immediate
20
problem, for, as D, W, Haralym remarks, it does nob seem
logical to speak of knowing something which is not the case
.
21
That is, if I claim to know that it is going to rain but it
doesn t, can it then be said that I knew that it was going
to rain? At best, I think, we could say that I believed it
was going to rain, for while it is not logically possible to
know something which is not the case, it is possible to be-
lieve it. To avoid any possible misunderstandings, it ought
to be made clear at this point that the conception of know-
ledge which I am positing in no sense implies that knowledge
is permanent; a claim to knowledge may be rejected whenever
the evidence ceases to support it. Thus, it implies no
contradiction to say that the pre-Ccpernicans knew that the
earth was the center of the universe, and we know that it is
not. What is being claimed is that knowledge entails vali-
dation, and that one cannot claim knowledge of that which
has not been validated or of that which is incapable of
validation.
This brings us to a second criterion of hypothetical
statements. Namely, that a sentence is an hypothesis only
when it entails the possibility of being tested. This
argument flows from the previous one that the veracity of an
hypothesis can only be determined in light of the evidence
which is brought to bear upon it. If it is impossible to
test such evidence in experience, it is impossible to evaluate
the hypothesis which it is thought to support. As an example
21
of how this principle may be violated, Carl Hempel cites
Francesco Sizi's attempt to refute Galileo's claim that
there are satellites orbiting around Jupiter#
There are seven windows in the head, two nostrils,
two ears, two eyes and a mouth; so in the heavens
there are two favorable stars, two unpropitious,
two luminaries, and Mercury alone undecided andindifferent. From which and many other similar
phenomena of nature such as the seven metals, etc.,
which it were tedious to enumerate, we gather
that the number of planets is necessarily seven. ...
Moreover, the satellites are invisible to the
naked eye and therefore can have no influence
on the earth and therefore would be useless and
therefore do not exist. 22
What is interesting about Sizi's refutation is not that he
was proven wrong, but that his arguments have no relevant
bearing on his hypothesis; and by relevant I mean that they
are incapable of being tested out in experience, they are
both literally and figuratively nonsensical. And, therefore,
they are totally incapable of supporting a claim to knowledge.
We have cited but two criteria for the formulation, and
identification of hypothetical sentences, but they are, I
believe., sufficient to support the claim that knowing cannot
be identical with the formulation of hypotheses, inasmuch as
the former entails an avowal which has been experientially
validated. This conception of knowing not only undermines the
notion that hypotheses can be equated with knowledge, it also
undermines the notion that hypothetical statements which have
been checked in some way are equivalent with knowledge; for
this latter instance, while it fulfills our second criterion
22
of testability, it does not, of necessity, fulfill the logi-
cal stipulation that one cannot know that which is not the
case. Which is a rather convoluted way of saying that many
hypotheses are experientially proven to be invalid.
Subjective knowing. Our analysis to this point has
focused on the problem of equating knowing and hypothesizing.
We have not, however, considered the question of whether or
not it is possible to know in different ways; or, to be more
precise, whether or not it makes any sense to argue that we
may know something subjectively, objectively, and inter-
personally. Is it indeed the case that these three modes of
knowing differ primarily in the manner in which we check our
hypotheses? We might best begin to deal with this question
by examining each mode of knowing in isolation, beginning
with the subjective mode.
Rogers states that "one important way of knowing is
through the formation of inner hypotheses, which are checked
by referring to our inward flow of experiencing as we live in
our subjective interaction with inner or outer events." J
This, to my knowledge, is the most precise statement which
Rogers provides concerning how we know subjectively. Never-
theless, it raises as many questions as it answers. How are
we to understand such phrases as "inner hypotheses," "inward
flow of experiencing," "subjective interaction," and "inner
or outer events"? The adjectives "inner" and "outer" are
particularly confusing. It does not seem to make a great
23
deal of sense to speak of "inner hypotheses" unless they
represent a set of hypotheses which are in some sense dis-
tinctly different. Are there such things as "outer hypothe-
ses"? Then, too, how would an "outward flow of experiencing"
differ from an "inward flow"? Can experience be bifurcated
so that it would be meaningful to speak of it as flowing in
one direction or another? I think not, for to speak of
experiencing as flowing, is to describe it metaphorically,
it is to acknowledge that experience is processual rather
than static \ but, as Robert Frost warned us, all metaphors
eventually break down if we choose to ignore their limitations
and Rogers has apparently stretched this one to the breaking
point.
Unlike the first two phrases, "inner and outer events"
has a certain common sense appeal about it, but it is no less
suspect. The problem is to identify an event to which one
could properly affix the adjectives "inner" and "outer."
This is by no means a simple task, for we shall have to immedi
ately concede that what we know of the "external" world we
know through our experiencing of it. Our experiencing is,
therefore, a part of the event, and, so, it appears that we
are mistaken when we speak of "outer events" in this way.
However, if we are to avoid the charge that this argument is
solopsistic, we must concede that it does not of logical
necessity preclude the possible existence of an external
world, and this concession may in some sense legitimatize
24
the conception of "inner" and "outer" events. On the other
hand, it still leaves us with the problem of where the
boundary lines are to be drawn. Rogers chooses the skin,
and while such a boundary is philosophically problematical,
we shall accept that idea for the sake of argument. In
addition, we will concede that there are private experiences;
that is, experiences to which only one person is privy. What
we will not at this moment concede, however, is that such
private experiences constitute knowing.
We will not make this final concession because there
is no logical reason to do so. We experience many things
which we do not claim to know; in fact, we have many ex-
periences in regard to which the term knowing is wholly in-
appropriate—aesthetic experience being a case in point.
One might, for example, claim to know many things about a
particular painting, but one would hardly speak of "knowing"
it except in the sense that one could identify it when he
saw it. It is quite possible to experience something and
make no claim to knowledge whatever. Which brings us to
the point of saying that while it is true that all knowing
entails experience, it is not the case that all experience
entails knowing. Something else must be present. Thinking
back to our earlier argument, one of the things which must
be present is an avowal that something is the case. And to
that we can affix the argument that knowledge of experiences
.
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involves their subsumption under one or mors concepts.
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We can clarify and illustrate what we mean by this through
reference to Rogers' example of the man who asks the question
"Do I really hate him or is it envy rather than hate which
I feel?" Let us assume for the moment that the man in
question knows only that the words "hate" and "envy" refer to
feeling states i they are otherwise meaningless to him, like
the words of a foreign language. Given this stipulation,
we might then ask what it is that the man could come to
know or better understand by referring to the flow of his
feelings. It could not be claimed that his experience will
help him to understand the concepts, and without an under-
standing of the concepts, it is difficult to see how he could
come to a better understanding or knowing of his feelings.
We shall argue, therefore, that our knowledge of subjective
experience is necessarily limited to our understanding of
the concepts which we apply to it, and, furthermore, that the
examination of our subjective experience is not in itself
capable of deepening our understanding of the concepts in-
volved. It is, however, equally important to note that con-
cepts are born of experience and are not imposed upon it "from
on high or from any external and a priori source," but
neither are they born of some exclusively "internal" source.
Concepts accrue meaning only when they are bom of the trans-
actional experience of living, and "when they are formed they
are also formative i they regulate the proper conduct of the
2 6
activities out of which they develop." Chisholm in his
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book Theory of Knowledge beautifully illustrates the re-
lationship that exists between conceptualization and knowing
by citing the following passage from Robinson Crusoe :
When one morning the day broke, and all unex-
pectedly before their eyes a ship stood, what it
was was evident at a glance to Crusoe.... But
how was it with Friday? As younger and uncivilized,
his eyes were presumably better than those of his
master. That is, Friday saw the ship really the
best of the two; and yet he could hardly be said
to see it at all. 27
Although both Crusoe and Friday see the ship in the
harbor, we may contrast their responses to it by saying that
Friday did not know what to make of it. The fact that he
experienced the ship more acutely than did Crusoe does not
alter the fact that he could not in one very important sense
"see" it at all. Crusoe, on the other hand, "sees" the ship
in terms of his experiential transactions with it, and in
terms of the meanings the concept "ship" has accrued through
those transactions.
Is it not also possible, however, for a man to develop
concepts which relate to his private experience? Wittgenstein
considers this question in the Philosophical Investigations
when he asks us to imagine a situation in which a number of
people are each given a box. Upon looking into his box, each
person finds that it contains an object of one sort or another,
or nothing at all* When asked what is in the box, each person
replies "a beetle" without regard for whatever it is that his
box does or does not contain. The point is that one cannot
2 ?
develop a meaningful private language, when a concept’s
referent is private, its meaning drops away. Thus, if know-
ing involves conceptualization, "there must be public and in
tersub jective agreement on the conditions under which the
concept gets a use .” 29 This in turn implies that every
meaningful concept which we apply to our private experience
has been publicly agreed upon, and, as the Wittgenstein
example clearly shows, such agreement cannot be based on
private events or experiences, such concepts must, there-
fore, acquire meaning through public transactions.
One of the reasons we are apt to rebel against the argu
ment just presented is that it seems absurd to ask a man who
says that he is angry, how he knows that he is angry. Our
knowledge of our own feelings appears to be so much more a
matter of certainty than does our knowledge of anything else
In truth, the situation might be exactly the reverse.
B. F, Skinner argues that "the contingencies under which a
child learns to describe his feelings are necessarily de-
fective, the verbal community cannot use the procedures
with which it teaches a child to describe objects. Our
analysis supports this view, and, in addition, suggests that
the very idea of subjective knowing rests on very tenuous
grounds.
Internersonal knowing. Our analysis of interpersonal
knowing will be brief—largely because the distinction
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between it and objective knowing is very fuzzy. When asked
about this at the symposium at Rice University, Rogers
responded by saying
t
...it is quite true that the same machinery of veri-
fication comes in when one wants to 'translate'
interpersonal knowing 'into objective science.' There
is, however, a 'different quality' to the 'tool of
empathy* when it is being used to check with a col-
league *our understanding of something Gout there}
'
and that 'same' tool of empathy 'when we are trying
to gain knowledge about another person (and) the
empathy is directed toward him. •* 31
There is something vague and mysterious about this
response; it seems more an evasion than an answer. What
is this "different quality" to which Rogers alludes, and
how exactly does it impinge upon the way in which we know?
Rogers provides no answer to this question, perhaps because
there is none. The only distinction that Rogers actually
does make is that this type of knowing applies primarily
to human beings, but this in no way legitimatizes it as a
"way" of knowing. I must confess that I fail to see any
distinction between "interpersonal" and "intersub jective"
knowing? both, it seems to me, check hypotheses in much the
same way. The scientific community, of course, makes no
distinction between "intersub jective knowing" and objective
knowing.
Objective knowing. If we have any quarrel with Rogers'
account of objective knowing, it has less to do with what he
says than with the way in which he says it. Specifically,
29
wo may take exception "to "the idea that "to know objectively is
merely to confirm that which is already known subjectively
or interpersonally
, Thus, the scientific community exists
largely to affirm the knowledge of a Galileo, a Kepler, or
an Einstein. Such a view fails to take note of the fact
that public verification is not something which is "tacked on"
to that which is already known but is an integral part of
the knowing process, itself. This is an extremely important
point, for it takes Rogers' argument that "All knowledge,
including all scientific knowledge, is a. vast inverted
pyramid resting on this tiny, personal, subjective base ,’^ 2
and turns it upside down--or, if you will, rightside up.
When viewed in this way, it is possible to argue that if
subjective and interpersonal knowing do exist, they exist
as sub-categories of objective knowing. And, if this, in
turn, is correct we ought to agree with Norman Malcolm that
third force psychology might well be but "one branch or
division of behavioristic science and not an alternative or
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addition to it." Rogers would probably attempt to refute
this charge on the grounds that behavioristic science is
necessarily limited to the study of observable events, but
this is clearly not true. Behaviorism is no more limited
to the study of observable events than is quantum mechanics,
or nuclear physics. B. F. Skinner responds explicitly to
this accusation by sayingj
30
Man is said "to differ from ether animals mainly
because he is 'aware of his own existence.' Heknows what he is doing i he knows that he has a
past and will have a future; he 'reflects on his
own nature;
' he alone follows the classical in-junction 'Know thyself.' Any analysis of human
behavior which neglected these facts would be de-
fective indeed,,,. But self
-observation can be
studied, and it must be included in any reasonably
complete account of human behavior. Rather than
ignore consciousness, an experimental analysis
of behavior has stressed certain crucial issues.
The question is not whether a man can know himself
but what he knows when he does so. 34
Skinner's remarks appear to dull the edge of Rogers'
argument that behaviorists are concerned exclusively with
that which is observable. In addition, Skinner suggests
that the basic disagreement between himself and Rogers does
not revolve around the question of whether or not internal
variables exist, but on the question of their role in the
shaping of behavior. Are internal variables the wellsprings
of behavior, or do they merely intervene between the stimulus
and the response? Rogers, I believe, would argue for the
former view, and the chapters which follow on his conceptions
of "self" and "freedom" should serve to explain why he
finds that position appealing.
Summary . The analysis undertaken in this chapter has
both positive and negative implications. On the one hand,
it suggests that Rogers' claim, that there are three distinct
ways of knowing, is both logically and conceptually inde-
fensible. Furthermore, it suggests that his arguments on the
limitations of Positivist-oriented science are largely un-
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founded. On the other hand some progress has been made
toward the establishment of a set of criteria for the eval-
uation of knowledge claims. These may be summarized as
follows
i
a) Knowing and experience are not equivalent concepts
inasmuch as the former entails the subsumption of
experience under one or more concepts.
b) Such concepts as are required for a knowledge claim
cannot be born wholly of private experience because
concepts can only accrue meaning through inter-
subjective agreement, and transactional experience.
c) Therefore, all knowing entails public verification
of one sort or another, or the utilization of con-
cepts whose meanings have been publicly agreed
upon.
If these criteria are tenable, then subjective knowing
is, at best, a function of intersub jective experience? it
cannot then be the base upon which all other knowing rests.
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CHAPTER III
SELF
There is an old joke in the building trade about a car-
penter who one day turned to his apprentice and said,
"Y'know, I've had this same hammer for nearly twenty years."
Gee!" said his apprentice, obviously impressed by the car-
penter s statement. "Yep," said the carpenter, "'course I
had to replace the head and the handle a couple of times."
That joke is really so old that even carpenters don't tell
it anymore. It does, however, call our attention to the
fact that we often use words in somewhat strange ways. If
The carpenter joke tickles us at all, it is probably because
we recognize that it is constructed around a paradoxical fact
of linguistic usage. We, ourselves, might have made some-
what the same claim as the carpenter, but we might have done
it in all seriousness. That is, we are almost inclined to
accept the argument that it is the same hammer.
Sydney Shoemaker (whose trade is philosophy) has, in
fact, provided us with a similar example which is even more
persuasive. He asks us to consider a bicycle most or all of
whose parts have been gradually replaced over a ten-year
period. He then asks us to consider whether or not it is
possible to speak of owning the same bike for ten years ? 1 In
terms of its parts it is obviously not the "same" bike. On
the other hand, if we owned such a bicycle, we might very
well claim that it was the same bike and it is unlikely that
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we would get much of an argument from anyone. In short. Shoe-
maker's bicycle example is designed to persuade us that physi-
cal identity is not the sole criterion of "sameness," that
experience and linguistic convention provide other criteria
which prove to be more serviceable. In the case of the bicy-
cle, temporal continuity seems to be an important element of
identification, and the recognition and acceptance of such
a criterion helps to free us from the notion that the identi-
ty of an object is wholly dependent on the constancy or immuta-
bility of its physical structure. In fact, the examples
just given may suggest that an inquiry into the problem of
identity ought to begin with a consideration of continuity,
both spatial and temporal, and not with a consideration of
that which appears to be permanent and unchanging. Regarding
this, we might reflect upon Dewey's remark that we do not
employ permanence as the measure of change, but, rather, we
evaluate those things which change rapidly in terms of other
things which change more slowly. While it is true that Dewey
was not directing this comment to the problem of identity,
we can readily perceive its relevancy to Shoemaker's bicycle
problem. That is, it seems that the ten-year span stipulated
in the illustration is not a wholly arbitrary period of time.
Were we to replace all of the bicycle parts within a two-week
period, we should be hard-pressed to argue that it remained
the same bike. Time appears to be a very important considera-
tion in this example, but why that is so is not altogether
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clear. I should like to suggest that it has something to do
with Dewey's observation. Namely, that the criterion of tem-
poral identity demands that there be sustained periods of
gradual change. //hat is significant in Shoemaker's example,
then, is not that we changed or replaced parts of the bicycle,
but that there were lengthy periods of time when we did not
replace parts. This observation may almost seem to suggest
that identity in this case is indeed determined during periods
of time when no changes at all were taking place, but this
is clearly not the case inasmuch as we know that many gradual
changes were occurring. The fact that certain parts eventu-
ally wore out and had to be replaced is in itself enough to
convince us of that. The real problem that we must confront
is how we distinguish changes which affect the identity of an
object from those which do not. A likely answer might be
that certain changes are themselves associated with the identi-
ty of an object while others are not. Thus, for example, the
movement of water in a river—the fact that the water that
I see at any given moment is different from the water that
I see at any other moment
—
presents no problem inasmuch as
it is the type of change which I associate with the very
meaning of the word "river." The wearing out of a bicycle
is a change which experience has taught me to expect and
accept as a natural process associated with the identity of
a bicycle. Getting back to Dewey's remark, we might conclude
3 ?
that, far from being mutually exclusive, "identity" entails
"change!" and, furthermore, that experience teaches us to
accept, and sometimes even to overlook, those changes which
are constituent elements in an object's identity.
When we alter the criteria of identity so as to empha-
size spatio-temporal continuity, we discover the identifi-
cation of particulars to be largely relational in character.
P. F. Strawson provides us with a useful example when he
writes*
If one is playing a game of cards, the distinc-
tive markings of a certain card constitute alogically adequate criterion for calling it, say,
the Queen of Hearts; but, in calling it this, in
the context of the game, one is ascribing to
it properties over and above the possession of
these markings. The predicate gets its meaning
from the whole structure of the game.
3
Strawson's example serves as a lucid though trivial, illustra-
tion of the more general argument that
the system of spatio-temporal relations has a pe-
culiar comprehensiveness and pervasiveness,
which qualify it uniquely to serve as the frame-
work within which we can organize our individuat-
ing thought about particulars. Every particular
either has its place in this system, or is of a
kind the members of which cannot in general be
identified except by reference to particulars of
other kinds which have their place in it; and
every particular which has its place in the system
has a unique place there. There is no other system
of relations between particulars of which all
this is true. Indeed any antithesis between this
and other systems of relations between particu-
lars would be a false antithesis. Though we may
freely depend on heterogeneous relations in fram-
ing identifying descriptions, the system of
spatio-temporal relations remains the groundwork
of these additions; most other relations between
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involvp
1
^
3
^
1'00^ 1'^ 6 spatio-temporal elements,e or are symbolized by spatio-temporal
,transactions, the relative movements of bodies.^
Perhaps the single most important point to be gleaned
from Strawson's argument and illustration is that all identi-
ty statements are predicated upon contextual relationships.
This argument is much the same as that cited by Dewey in
his paper, "Context and Thought." 5 Dewey, of course, went
at least one step farther by pointing out that when we ig-
nore context, our inquiry either terminates in "a doctrine
of atomistic particularism," or in generalizations which
overstep the "limiting conditions set by the contextual
situation." This is an extremely important point inasmuch as
it focuses on a common and persistent shortcoming in the
arguments of many authors who have dealt with the problem of
identity, and it would appear to be particularly true of
those writings which specifically consider the problem of
personal identity.
Take, for example, B. 0. Williams' argument that memory
cannot be used as a criterion of personal identity inasmuch
as a man who has lost his memory is not only incapable of
saying who he is but "cannot say who anyone else is, either,
nor whether any object is the same as one previously pre-
sented, since he will not remember the previous presentation.
Williams' argument makes sense providing that we allow that
there is a clear distinction between personal identity and
the context of identity. But, can we realistically allow
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such a distinction? Is it not the case, as William James
pointed out, that a man's identity is in large measure re-
lational and contextual?^ When a man cannot say who anyone
else is, nor whether an object is the same as one previously
presented, he has lost touch with the system of particular
and unique relations which make the concept of identity
meaningful. Ionesco provides us with a dramatic example
of the relationship between identity and context in his
pl&y Rhinoc eros . At the end of the play everyone in a
small, provincial, French town has turned into a rhinoceros.
All, that is, save one character named Berenger. Near the
close of the play Berenger soliloquizes as follows:
I can't bear the sound of them any longer, I'm
going to put cotton wool in my ears. (He does so,
and talks to himself in the mirror.) The only
solution is to convince thern--but convince them
of what? Are the changes reversible, that's the
point? Are they reversible? It would be a
labour of Hercules, far beyond me. In any case,
to convince them you'd have to talk to them. And
to talk to them I'd have to learn their language.
Or they'd have to learn mine. But what language
do I speak? What is my language? Am I talking
French? Yes, it must be French. But what is
French? I can call it French if I want, and nobody
can say it isn't—I'm the only one who speaks it.
What am I saying? Do I? (He crosses to the
middle of the room.) And what if it's true what
Daisy said, and they're the ones in the right?
(He turns back to the mirror.) A man's not ugly
to look at, not ugly at all! (He examines himself,
passing his hand over his face). What a funny look-
ing thing! What do I look like? What? (He
darts to a cupboard, takes out some photographs
which he examines.) Photographs! Who are all these
people? Is it Mr. Papillon—-or is it Daisy? And
is that Botard or Dudard or Jean? Or is it me?
(He rushes to the cupboard again and takes out two
or three pictures.) Now I recognize me: that's
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me
,
that ' s me ! ...
(When he hangs the pictures one sees thatthey are of an old man, a huge woman, and
another man.
. .
.
)
8
The previous quotation illustrates that aspect of the identi-
ty problem which B. 0. Williams failed to grasp. Namely,
that there is no clear line of demarcation between personal
identity and its context because the two wash over into
each other in the form of experiential transactions. That
we do not clearly recognize this ambiguity may be due, at
least in part, to conceptual deficiencies inherent in the
way in which we use ordinary language. The explicitly
possessive structure of such phrases as, "my friends,"
"my house," "my job," and "my hand" persuade us that identity
and context are related to each other in such a way that only
the contextual word in each phrase is modified or more
clearly identified. However, when we consider the trans-
actional nature of experience, we discover that this is not
the case. The phrase "my friends," for example, though
grammatically possessive, refers to an experiential relation-
ship which is essentially functional. Like Berenger in
Ionesco's play we lose touch with our identities when the
interpersonal transactions which help constitute them are
destroyed or radically altered. This same argument, I
believe, can be applied with equal force to the other phrases
listed above.
A distinct advantage of transactional analysis, then,
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is that it avoids the common pitfall of believing that a
concept must have a singular, indivisible referent. Thus,
we may argue that bodily identity and personal identity are
not the same, and, at the same time avoid the objection of
writers like B. 0. Williams who would argue that bodily
identity cannot be completely dismissed. We, of course,
have not suggested that bodily identity is wholly superfluous
but, rather, that it is but one element in a larger transact
tional scheme.
In one sense, then, it might be said that we are abandon
ing a concept of personal identity in favor of a theory of
identity which tends to be more inclusive and parsimonious.^
In addition, we have selected a transactional theory because
it avoids many of the epistemological problems which arise
when we attempt to deal with particulars outside of their
spatio-temporal context.
Person and Self . The word "person" is generally sub-
stituted for the word "self" in philosophical writings if
only because the latter term retains "a slight flavor of
scientific obscenity." 10 Specifically, the concept has
often been used to beg the question. Gordon Allport notes
that, "It is temptingly easy to assign functions that are
not fully understood to a mysterious central agency, and
then declare that 'it' performs in such a way as to unify
the personality and maintain its integrity." 11 The philo-
sophical objections to such a notion elicited a similar re-
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sponse in the psychological sciences beginning with Wundt's
plea for "a psychology without a soul ." 12 To some extent
that objective has been realized, particularly in the work
of those psychologists who are behaviorally inclined, but in
recent years the concept of self has been revived by a
number of psychologists who apparently feel that they have
need of it. This seems to be particularly true of those
psychologists who lay claim to existential, or phenomeno-
logical roots—Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and Rollo Kay
to mention but a few. In addition to their reviving of the
self concept, these men have also created a number of ancill-
ary terms such as "self-image," "self-actualization,"
"self-affirmation," and "self-enhancement." Needless to
say, a number of behavioral psychologists consider such
hyphenates to be as tainted as the word from which they are
. 13derived. Perhaps more so, for if "self-actualization"
is not one of the grand examples of a psychological "deus
ex machina," what is?
On the other hand, to impugn the motives of the existen-
tial and phenomenological psychologists would not be wholly
just. In reading Rogers, for example, one cannot help but
feel that he chooses words, not because they lack ambiguity,
but, rather, because they are productive in the psychothera-
peutic situation. They are productive because they are the
words that the client himself uses and understands. It makes
little or no sense to argue that Rogers ought to caution his
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clients that the word "self is philosophically ambiguous.
In fact, the efficacy of ordinary language in such a situa-
tion is as good a reason as any to insist that it be in-
cluded in the vocabulary of the psychological sciences.
This, however, is by no means a justification for ambiguity
in professional writings. When communicating with colleagues
in the scientific community, precision is a necessary requi-
site.
In this regard, we might note that a lack of conceptual
clarity is a characteristic shortcoming in much of the work
done by third force psychologists. The following, I believe,
is as close as one can get to a Rogerian definition of self.
He writes that the self is "an organized, fluid, but con-
sistent conceptual pattern of perception of characteristics
and relationships of the 'I' or the 'me,' together with values
attached to these concepts." Clearly the central diffi-
culty with this statement is that it must presuppose a con-
cept of self in order to define the self. Having struggled
with the tortuous grammatical structure, we find that the self
consists of certain attributes of an "I" or a "me." But how
are we to account for those very concepts? Is it not the
case that "I" and "me” are nothing other than the pronoun
substitutes that we use when referring to the "self?" We
might avoid this objection by recasting the sentence to
read* The self is an organized, fluid, but consistent
conceptual pattern of perceptions, characteristics, re-
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lationships and values. But, this is excessively confusing.
Additional information is required. Perhaps the following
passage will prove helpful—it is Rogers attempting to para-
phrase the statement of one of his clients.
Let me see if I can take her poetic expression
and translate it into the meaning it has for me.
I believe she is saying that to be herself means
to find the pattern, the underlying order, which
exists in the ceaselessly changing flow of her
experience. Rather than to try to hold her experi-
ence into the form of a mask, or to make it be
a form or structure that it is not, being herself
means. to discover the unity and harmony which ex-
ists in her own actual feelings and reactions.
It means that. the real self is something which is
comfortably discovered in one's experiences, not
something imposed upon it. 15
Ab in the previous passage, the continuity of experience is
given particular stress. And, here too, we encounter the
idea of an orderly, experiential pattern, but what is most
intriguing is the argument that the "real self" is discovered
in experience and is not something imposed upon it. What
does this mean? Quite obviously it is Rogers' intention to
juxtapose the notion of "real self" and the notion of "the
mask," but how do we distinguish between the two? And that
is only the beginning. We might also ask what Rogers means
when he speaks of "actual feelings and reactions." "Actual"
as opposed to what? If "actual" is understood to mean "real"
or "existing," are not all feelings and reactions "actual?"
Perhaps he wishes us to understand the word to mean "genuine,
but, again, if we are not consciously pretending or acting,
are not all feelings and reactions genuine? But, all of
^5
these questions strike at issues which are merely elementary
parts of a more general problem. The basic issue is, can
we legitimately distinguish between an actual, genuine,
existing, real self, and a self (or selves) which is none
of these things? Rogers obviously believes that we can,
and he makes a start in that direction by arguing that;
Whether one calls it a growth tendency, a drive
toward self actualization, or a forward—moving
directional tendency, it is the mainspring of life,
and is, in the last analysis, the tendency upon
which all psychotherapy depends. It is the urge
which is evident in all organic and human life—to
expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature
—
the tendency to express and activate all the capaci-
ties of the organism, to the extent that such acti-
vation enhances the organism or the self. This
tendency may become deeply buried under layer after
layer of encrusted psychological defences; it
may be. hidden behind elaborate facades which deny
its existence; but it is my belief that it exists
in every individual, and awaits only the proper
conditions to be released and expressed.
It seems quite apparent that Rogers is either equating
self with an inherent tendency for growth, or is arguing
that self is a function of that tendency. Equally apparent
is the notion that psychological defences and facades often
obscure the existence of the growth tendency and the real
self. Furthermore, these defences and facades are not in-
herent in the organism, but, rather, are reactions to un-
favorable environmental conditions. The distinction, then,
between self and facade is basically predicated on the avowal
that human beings have a natural disposition or tendency for
positive growth, and that facades and masks can be under-
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stood as a metaphorical way of speaking about the retardation
or paralysis of that tendency.
The philosophical difficulties inherent in such a view
of self are legion. And, not least among them is the diffi-
culty of understanding what is meant by a "natural tendency."
In this case there can be little doubt that Rogers intends
"natural tendency" to mean an organismic disposition to grow;
and, further, that, while it may be affected by the environ-
ment, the environment is not one of its constituents. The
logical question to put to such a view is "what experiential
evidence is available to support such an argument?" None!
In fact one cannot even think where to begin to look for
evidence because we cannot study human beings in a vacuum.
Ashley Montague made this very point in the context of the
nature vs. nurture argument, pointing out that genetic
traits and environmental contingencies are quite inseparable
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of each other. Truly, it makes no sense at all to speak
of genetic traits or dispositions outside of the transaction-
al context of organism and environment. It is not simply
a matter of environments which permit or impede growth.
We all recognize that there are such environments; the ques-
tion is whether noncontextual terms like "tendencies," "dis-
positions," "potentialities," and "propensities" do not serve
to merely beg the question. One is reminded of B. F. Skinner's
observation that physicists once argued that the acceleration
18
rate of a falling body was due to its sense of jubilance.
4?
Today, of course, we find such an explanation absurd, but how
does it differ from Rogers' argument that a man grows be-
cause he is possessed of an inherent tendency to do so?
A second question, and the one of primary concern in
this chapter, flows naturally from the first. That is, if
the idea of a growth tendency cannot be defended as a tenable
of human development, then how can we preserve
the notion of a real self1 ? The answer, I believe, is that
we can't and that it would be unwise to do so. Unwise if
only because the idea of a real self is likely to lead to
the logical error that a concept must have a singular, indi-
visible referent--a point which we discussed earlier in the
chapter. At best, I believe, Rogers' term "real self" can
be thought of as a value judgment predicated on the argument
that organisms which are capable of adjusting their behavior
so as to cope with a large variety of situations are health-
ier than those which can not. Time and time again Rogers
reports that at the end of therapy his clients had learned
to deal with problems which had paralyzed them at the outset.
Rogers, of course, couches the process in his own terms. He
speaks of "being one's emotions," or "fully experiencing one's
self}" however, most, and perhaps all, of Rogers observations
can be reduced or translated into statements about behavior.
Thus, in that regard, they do not represent a major concern.
What is of concern is that Rogers' theory of self is basically
non-contextual, and results in the belief that behavioral
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changes occur when people look "into" their feelings and dis-
cover that they are essentially good. A detailed examina-
tion of Rogers' description of what happens to a client in
therapy confirms how non-contextual his theory is.
M
T.P . Be That Self Which One Truly Is ." In chapter eight
of On Becoming a Person
, the title of which serves as a
heading for this chapter section, Carl Rogers discusses the
important changes experienced by a client in therapy. He
lists ten. We shall deal with each in its turn, pointing
out that most, if not all, demonstrate a general disregard
for context.
1) The first trend cited by Rogers is described as a
moving away from facades. He writes*
I observe first that characteristically the client
shows a tendency to move away, hesitantly and fear-
fully, from a self that he is net . In other words
even though there may be no recognition of what he
might be moving toward, he is moving away from
something. And of course in so doing he is beginning
to define, however negatively, what he is. 19
He then cites the following examples
Thus one eighteen-year-old boy says in an early inter-
views *1 know I'm not so hot, and I'm afraid they'll
find it out. That's why I do these things.... They're
going to find out some day that I'm not so hot. I'm
just trying to put that day off as long as possible....
If you knew me as well as I know myself—
.
(Pause)
I 'm not going to tell you the person I really think
I am. There's only one place I won't cooperate
and that's it.... It wouldn't help your opinion of
me to know what I think of my self.'^O
Rogers* observation on this example is that "the very
expression of this fear is a part of becoming what he is." 21
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And, that "he is coming closer to being himself , namely a
frightened person behind a facade because he regards himself
as too awful to be seen." 22 It is interesting that Rogers'
analysis completely ignores an entire aspect of the boy's
problem; i.e., his social relationships. Rogers is inter-
ested in how the boy perceives himself; the boy is concerned
about how others will perceive him. This, of course, cannot
be taken as a criticism of Rogers inasmuch as he is focusing
his attention on a particular point which he wishes to make,
but it is indicative of an orientation which pervades his
work, and often makes his explanations seem far more com-
plex and obscure than need be. He might just as easily
have said that the boy's fear was a behavioral response to
a threatening situation. It is not entirely clear that any
reference to "self" is at all necessary for a reasonable
explanation of problems presented in this example.
2) A second and related stage is described as moving
away from "oughts." Rogers says about thisi
Another tendency of this sort seems evident in
the client's moving away from the compelling image
of what he 'ought to be.' Some individuals have
absorbed so deeply from their parents the concept
'I ought to be good,* or 'I have to be good,' that
it is only with the greatest of inward struggle
that they find themselves moving away from this
goal. 2 3
We might best refrain from commenting for the moment because
stages three and four are nearly identical to this one, and
we can consider them as a group*
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3) Stage three is identified as moving away from
meeting expectations. For the client it is a moving away
from what the culture and its institutions expect him to
24be. Rogers notes that "when clients are free to be any
way they wish, they tend to resent and to question the
tendency of the organization, the college or the culture to
mould them to any given form." 2 -’
4) Rogers has called this stage "away from pleasing
others." Actually, it does not appear to be a separate
stage, but, rather, a summary statement, unless one wishes
to consider "pleasing others" to be a basic motivation for
meeting expectations or behaving in terms of "oughts." In
any event, Rogers does summarize by sayingi
So one may say that in a somewhat negative way,
clients define their goal, their purpose, by dis-
covering, in the freedom and the safety of an
understanding relationship, some of the directions
they do not wish to move. They prefer not to hide
themselves and their feelings from themselves, or
even from some significant others. They do not
wish to be what they "ought" to be, whether that
imperative is set by parents, or by the culture,
whether it is defined positively or negatively.
They do not wish to mould themselves and their
behavior into a form which would be merely pleas-
ing to others. They do not, in other words, choose
to be anything which is artificial, anything. which
is imposed, anything which is defined from without.
We all can, I think, understand and identify with Rogers*
arguments, for they can all be reduced to the simple notion
that parents, friends, and social institutions can, and
often do, inhibit the growth of an individual, through the
imposition of unrealistic or unrealizable standards and ex-
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pectations. But we are compelled to point out that the indi-
vidual s desire to forsake such standards and expectations
is not motivated by any exclusively private, organismic
agency i but is predicated on the individual's inability to
function adequately in certain existential contexts. What
this means, I believe, is that all standards, values, and
attitudes are initially developed in transactional situations.
Whether the individual "feels" that they belong to him or
not, is determined by his ability to function in his
environment. Any one of Rogers' clients might in another
context, in another time or place, feel perfectly contented
and satisfied.
The expectations of parents, friends, and teachers are
not inherently repressive, but they may become so when they
are structured in such a way that the individual must vio-
late one set of expectations in order to meet another.
Unlike the initial four stages that Rogers describes,
stages five through ten represent a movement toward the
"real self." Here, as will become apparent, the idea that
man has an inherently positive nature is even more force-
fully posited than it was in the initial stages. The reader
is advised that commentary will be postponed until all six
stages have been presented.
5) Moving toward self-direction. Of this stage Rogers
says*
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First of all the client moves toward being autono-
mous. By this I mean that gradually he chooses
the goals toward which he wants to move. He be-
comes responsible for himself. He decides what
activities and ways of behaving have meaning forhim, and what do not . 27
6) Moving toward being a process 1
The second observation is difficult to make, because
we do not have good words for it. Clients seem
to move toward more openly being a process, a fluidity,
a changing. They are not disturbed to find that
they are not the same from day to day, that they do
not always hold the same feelings toward a given
experience or person, that they are not always
consistent. They are in flux, and seem more content
to continue in this flowing current. The striving
for conclusions and end statements seems to diminish.
7) Moving toward being complexity:
I find that this desire to be all of oneself in each
moment—all the richness and complexity, with
nothing feared in oneself—this is a common desire
in those who have seemed to show much movement in
therapy. I do not need to say that this is a diff-
icult, and in its absolute sense an impossible
goal. Yet one of the most evident trends in clients
is to move toward becoming all of the complexity
of one's changing self in each significant moment. 29
8) Moving toward openness to experience:
•To be that self which one truly is' involves still
other components. One which has perhaps been im-
plied already is that the individual moves toward
living in an open, friendly, close relationship to
his own experience. This does not occur easily.
Often as the client senses some new facet of himself,
he initially rejects it. Only as he experiences
such a hitherto denied aspect of himself in an
acceptant climate can he tentatively accept it as
a part df himself. 30
9) Moving toward acceptance of others:
Closely related to this openness to inner and outer
experience in general is an openness to and an
acceptance of other individuals. As a client moves
toward being able to accept his own experience,
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he also moves "toward "the acceptance of the experience
of others. 31
10) Moving toward a trust of self*
Time and time again in my clients, I have seen
simple people become significant and creative in
their own spheres, as they have developed more
trust of the processes going on within themselves,
and have dared to feel their own feelings, live by
values which they have discovered within, and ex-
press themselves in their own unique ways. 32
That a connection exists between Rogers' concept of
self and his concept of knowing is, I think, quite obvious.
In both cases the basic criterion of valuation is subjective
experience. And insofar as this is true, we may raise many
of the same questions and apply many of the same criticisms
to his concept of self as were raised and applied to his con-
cept of knowing. We should specifically question the argu-
ment that we must first learn to trust and accept our own
experiences and feelings, and then we may come to a greater
acceptance of the experiences of others. The problem with
such a view is that the meaning of an experience is always
contextual and social, and, as was suggested in the previous
chapter, "meaning" is grounded in symbols, and language
serves as the predominant system of symbolization. Thus,
the self emerges, not in experience, but in the symbols of
experience, symbols learned from others; and we must come,
therefore, to understand and trust the experiences of others
before we can understand and trust our own. Otherwise we
should have to grant that all living things are possessed
of a self, and this clearly seems absurd. Absurd because
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"self" is a public concept which refers not to experience
per se but to the way in which experience is organized and
reflected upon. To make it a private concept is to strip
it of its meaning.
George Herbert Mead addressed himself to this issue
when he wrote*
The self has a character which is different from
the physiological organism proper. The self is
something which has a development} it is not ini-
tially there at birth, but arises in the process
of social experience and activity, that is, de-
velops in a given individual as a result of his
relation to that process as a whole and to other
individuals within that process. The intelligence
of the lower forms of animal life, like a great deal
of human intelligence, does not involve a self.
In our habitual actions, for example, in our moving
about in a world that is simply there and to which
we are so adjusted that no thinking is involved,
there is a certain amount of sensuous experience
such as persons have when they are waking up, a
bare thereness of the world. 33
Mead's point, I believe, is that we are inclined to
think that there is a self accompanying, and taking part in
each and every experience that we have, when, in fact, we
have many experiences which do not engage the self at
all. As Mead says, "When one is running to get away from some-
one who is chasing him, he is entirely occupied in this
action, and his experience may be swallowed up in the objects
about him, so that he has, at the time being, no consciousness
of self at all."'^ From this example, and others like it
that one might think of, it becomes fairly clear that the self
enters into experience in moments of reflection—in moments
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when, say, for the purpose of evaluation, one assumes the
role of "the other." We stand back from our experiences and
observe how we behaved. Interestingly enough we often use
the second person pronoun in addressing ourselves, saying
you did a good job," or "you really fouled up that time."
And, it is not surprising that this is the case, for as
children we first learn to become objects toward ourselves
by assuming the roles of others in our play. In this way
we not only try on many different personalities, but we
utilize each role to make judgments about the other roles
that we had assumed. Needless to say this process does not
terminate in childhood or adolescence, but continues on to
some extent throughout our lives.
Nov/ all of this, I believe., has a great bearing on the
ten stages, or trends, that Rogers has described. First of
all, it suggests that if we closely examine the process which
is being described, we will find that the client is not
moving away from a facade toward a real self, but, rather, is
struggling to break away from "that particular self" or "those
particular selves" which do not allow him to have satisfying
"non-self" experiences. That's confusing, I'm sure. Let's
put it this way* every individual needs to have experiences
which are satisfying in one sense or another, and many of
these experiences at the time of their occurrence do not in-
volve the self ; however, if the individual in question has
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acquired a self which is unduly critical or demanding he may
be quite incapable of having such experiences. In fact, if
the self is excessively harsh, reflection may become so pain-
ful that an individual may forsake it altogether, or he
might refrain from engaging in experiences which are challeng-
ing and demand reflection. I believe we can find both kinds
of problems in the case histories that Rogers tells us about.
But this analysis goes only half way, for as we have
just suggested not having a self can be as problematical as
having a self which is repressive, and, here, I believe, is
where Rogers enters the picture. He enters by way of his
attitude and behavior, and in his writings he continually
stresses the importance of these factors. In particular, he
emphasizes that the therapist must free his client from
"the threat of external evaluation” and treat him with
"unconditional positive regard.” These two phrases seem
almost contradictory, but what I believe Rogers to be saying
is that a person who is suffering from his own self evaluation
does not need additional evaluation; he needs understanding
and empathy--in other words, those feelings which he cannot
find in himself. What Rogers does not appear to recognize,
or more probably does not wish to publicly acknowledge, is
that he, in the process of therapy, becomes "the other" upon
which the client* s new self is modeled. I believe that he
does realize this, and it is for this reason he insists that
it is more important that the therapist be a certain kind
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of person than that he learn certain technical skills. Thus,
he emphasizes what the therapist should be rather than what
he should do.
In addition, I should like to cite Rogers' adaptation
of the group therapy session as further evidence of his aware-
ness of the importance of role models. I cite this as evi-
dence in spite of the fact that most group therapists will
argue that they work in groups so as to reach a larger number
of people. I am inclined to believe they also work in groups
because they recognize that the larger the number of role
models available to an individual the larger is the number of
personality characteristics from which to choose. On this
point Mead has written*
If the given human individual is to develop a self
in the fullest sense, it is not sufficient for him
merely to take the attitudes of other human individuals
toward himself and toward one another within the
human social process, and to bring that social pro-
cess as a whole into his individual experience
merely in these terms: he must also, in the same
way that he takes the attitudes of other individuals
toward himself and toward one another, take their
attitudes toward the various phases or aspects of the
common social activity or set of social undertakings
in which, as members of an organized society or
social group, they are all engaged; and he must then,
by generalizing these individual attitudes of that
organized society or social group itself, as a whole,
act toward different social projects which at any
given time it is carrying out, or tov/ard the various
larger phases of the general social process which
constitutes its life and of which. these projects
are a specific manifestation. This getting of the
broad activities of any given social whole or
organized society as such within the experiential
field of any one of the individuals involved or included
in that whole is, in other words, the essential basis
and prerequisite of the fullest development ol that,
individual's self:... 35
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Mead's argument stresses not only diversity, in terms of
the number of role models, but unity of purpose in social
interaction. This, I believe, is in total congruence with
therapeutic, group processes.
The conclusion which I should like to draw from all of
this has basically to do with the apparent inconsistencies
which exist between Rogerian theory and practice. Specifically,
I should like to argue that Rogers' affinity for subjectivism
has led him to the positing of a theory of self which is large-
ly irrelevant to what he does in the therapeutic situation.
In fact, parts of it may be absolutely contradictory. In
effect, Mead's transactional theory of self comes closer to
guiding Rogers* practice than does his own, and this may
well account for its effectiveness. However, Rogers' love
affair with subjectivism has its dangerous side in that it
pulls him away from these sounder principles whenever he
attempts to expound in subject areas other than his own.
This seems to be particularly true of his educational
writings, a matter which we will discuss at length in a
subsequent chapter, wherein subjectivism often becomes synony-
mous with the forsaking of responsibility.
Summary . During the first half of this century, philo-
sophers of both Positivistic and Pragmatic persuasion challeng-
ed the use of the concept of self. The former argued that the
term was unnecessary and misleading, and that it ought to be
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abandoned altogether. The latter, adopting a somewhat more
conservative posture, argued that the self might be re-
tained but only as the phenomenal by-product of transactional
behavior. The self as "agent" was considered, by both schools,
to be wholly untenable.
Needless to say, Positivist and Pragmatist thinking
had a significant impact on the direction and scope of
twentieth-century psychology, and, as a consequence, the
self, if it did not entirely disappear, was employed by
psychologists with the greatest of caution.
In recent years, however, a number of psychologists and
psychotherapists have revived the concept, making it an
important element in their theories of personality. Carl
Rogers is a member of this group. Unfortunately, however,
his conception of self often violates Pragmatist guidelines
and reverts back to that meaning of the term which is most
problematical. When this occurs, we generally discover that
his ude of the term is either ambiguous, or that it serves
to beg the question by ignoring the contextual and trans-
actional implications of human behavior. This fact is of
particular importance when we come to see that it is the
self which lays the groundwork for Rogers' conception of
freedom as autonomy.
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CHAPTER IV
FREEDOM
If we wished to sum up the inquiry undertaken in the
previous two chapters, we should have to begin by noting
that, in general, the thrust of our analysis has focused on
the problem of stipulated definitions; e.g., on the rela-
tionship that exists between the definiendum, the definiens,
and their existential referent. To be more explicit, we have
argued that a stipulated definition ought to be evaluated in
terms of its ability to promote or extend inquiry, and not
in terms of its ability to satisfy the subjective needs of
a particular inquirer. This means that such definitions must
conform to certain standards and guidelines if they are to
be at all useful. Popp suggests three criteria for the
positing of meaningful definitions* a) that they be stated
"in the clearest and most precise manner," b) that the
predicate (definiens) state conditions which are "indi-
vidually necessary and jointly sufficient for the definiendum,"
and c) that "some reason or grounds should be given which
shows that the suggested definition is more desirable than
alternative formulations ." 1 To Popp's three criteria we can
add two additional guidelines. First, that a definition
must conform to its existential referent. And, second, that
a definition should not depart so radically from standard
usage that it necessitates the reworking or a large number of
ancillary definitions.
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This last point may seem somewhat problematical, but,
in effect, it is an attempt to recognize that it is often
impossible to modify an existing definition in isolation
from a number of other related definitions. Whether or not
it is worthwhile is a pragmatic question which must be
answered by weighing the complexity of the task at hand
against the benefits to be derived from its undertaking.
The point is, of course, that Rogers* definitions appear
to violate all of these guidelines. They are, as we have
demonstrated, neither clear nor precise. They do not state
conditions which are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient to render them adequate for proper understanding.
(This appears to be particularly true of his definition of
knowing.) By ignoring context, in general, and transactional
processes, in particular, they fail to conform to existential
referents. And, insofar as all of this is the case, it is
doubtful that adequate reasons or grounds can be given to
warrant their adoption.
Finally, and this is the point most relevant to this
particular chapter, it is becoming increasingly apparent
that each of Rogers* stipulated definitions requires the re-
defining of a number of related definitions and each new
definition seems to bring with it a host of conceptual prob-
lems. We discover, therefore, that we are continually pro-
voked to ask if Rogers* conceptual scheme is really worth
all that bother. In this chapter we shall attempt to answer
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that question by engaging in an analysis of yet another
Rogerian concept, "freedom.- I think that it will become
increasingly evident that each new concept that Rogers intro-
duces into his psychological theory widens the gap between
theory and practice, and obscures the basic thrust of his
practice.
In the previous chapter we took note of the fact that
Carl Rogers is possessed of a basic trust in the human
organism. He believes, in effect, that individuals ought to
trust their inner urgings and feelings; and that if they do
this, they are less likely to be led astray by forces which
would unnaturally inhibit their growth. It is this basic
trust in the human organism, in its ability to value, in
its ability to grow in positive directions which leads him
to posit his theory of freedom. He writes
i
If I distrust the human being then I must cram him
with the information of my own choosing, lest he
go his own mistaken way. But if I trust the
capacity of the human individual for developing
his own potentiality, then I can provide him with
many opportunities and permit him to choose his
own way and his own direction in learning. 2
And*
I have little sympathy with the rather prevalent
concept that man is basically irrational, and that
his impulses, if not controlled, will lead to de-
struction of others and self. Man's behavior is
exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and
ordered complexity toward the goals his organism
is endeavoring to achieve. 3
It is worth noting that Rogers offers us but two altema
tives* either man is basically irrational and destructive,
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or exquisitely rational and trustworthy. Given such a
choice, it is easy to take sides, but what of the other
alternatives. No apparent logical contradiction seems to
be inherent in the view that man might be irrational and
trustworthy, or in the view that he might be rational and
destructive. In fact, given all of the possible alternatives,
we might question whether the idea of basic rationality or
irrationality can lead to any productive conclusions. Once
again we are confronted with a non-contextual formulation
which leads to a dubious bifurcation. If we ask ourselves
what it means to be rational, we quickly come to see that
it implies, at the very least, an understanding of the con-
sequences which flow from our actions; and it is equally
obvious that an understanding of consequences involves a
base of experience (both personal and social), and a set
of manipulative symbols. In brief, rationality implies the
capability of acting responsibly. Would Rogers, then, hold
a young child responsible for all of his actions? It seems
unlikely. He may argue that he will act rationally if the
circumstances do not lead him astray, pervert his basic
instincts, but this is a weak argument for two reasons. First,
it is circular because it leads to the argument that the child
is responsible when he does the "right" thing, and that the
environment is responsible when he does the "wrong" thing.
The argument is obviously self-fulfilling. Second, even
if the child's actions are in accordance with what we consider
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to be reasonable and rational behavior, that is the most that
can be said of them. They conform to reasonable standards,
but they do not of necessity imply reason and responsibility.
The question, of course, arises* M If a child is not
rational, is it not the case that he must be irrational?"
Clearly, this does not follow, for an additional distinction
must be made between actions which are irrational and those
which are "arational." The distinction, I believe, is one
of possibility. The following example may serve to illu-
strate the point. If we consider a chess player who is
intimately acquainted with the game of chess so that, in most
circumstances, his moves are made after considerable delibera-
tion of the many facets of the game, we should be inclined
to say that his actions in this regard are both logical
and rational. But, if on a particular occasion he neglects
his analysis and makes a move which is an obvious blunder,
then we could legitimately say that his action was irrational.
In other words, we know that he is capable of rational chess,
that his chess is normally very logical, but on this occasion
he neglected his ability to reason. On the other hand, we
might place a chess board in front of a two-year-old child,
teach him how the pieces move, and attempt to play a game
with him. In such a circumstance we might say that the child
was irrational if he moved the pieces incorrectly, but it
would be foolish to argue that his defense or attack was
irrational unless we could demonstrate that he had an under-
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standing of certain principles. Since he does not possess
such knowledge, such capability, calling his actions irration-
al makes little sense.
Thus, in the first example, we can say that the chess
player ought to have known better, but, in the latter
example the question of "knowing better" does not apply. in
other words, the concept of irrationality implies some
understanding of what it means to be rational; and such an
understanding is bound up in experience and the symbols of
discourse. Irrationality, then, constitutes a neglect of, or
an opposing of, both experience and the symbols derived from
it; whereas, "arationality" consists of a lack of experience
and an ignorance of its symbolic representation. If we
grant that this analysis has some validity, then there is no
reason why we should accept Rogers' "either/or" argument;
in fact, we have suggested several good reasons why we ought
to reject it.
Responsibility
. If "inherent rationality" serves as
Rogers' ontological justification of freedom, "responsibility"
is its moral justification. True to the spirit, if not the
letter, of Rationalist, and Existentialist thought, Rogers
repeatedly argues that only a free man, an autonomous man, can
be a responsible man. He writes*
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Freedom rightly understood is a fulfillment by
the person of the ordered sequence of his life.
The free man moves out voluntarily, freely, re-
sponsibly, to play his significant part in a world
whose determined events move through him and
through his spontaneous choice and will. 4
In addition, Rogers comments M that one cannot live a
complete life without such personal freedom and responsibility,
and that self-understanding and responsible choice make a
sharp and measurable difference in the behavior of the indi-
vidual,"^
Paradoxically, Rogers also speaks of "responsible free-
dom," e.g., freedom born of responsibility. The paradox is
not readily apparent until one considers the propositions which
can be derived from the two formulations. In the former
instance, Rogers seems to be saying that only a free man can
be responsible, that responsibility is dependent upon the
ability to freely choose a course of action. In the latter,
he seems to be saying that a man can be free only to the
extent that he is capable of exhibiting rational responses
to environmental stimuli. The first proposition is predicated
on the concepts of choice and willi the second on the power
to respond. The paradox arises because one proposition is
clearly at odds with deterministic thinking! whereas, the
other is not. For his part, Rogers accepts the paradox.
A part of modern living is to face the paradox
that, viewed from one perspective, man is a com-
plex machine. We are every day moving toward a
more precise control of this objective mechanism
which we call man. On the other hand, in another
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significant dimension of his existence, man is
subjectively free; his personal choice and re-
^°^ 1 5oi
ltLaCC °U?? for the shape of his life » heiw in fact the architect of himself. A truly
crucial part. of his existence is the discovery ofhis own meaningful commitment to life with all
of his being.
If in response to this you say, 'But these views
cannot both be true,' my answer is, "This is a deepparadox with which we must learn to live.' 6
Overlooking the incredible arrogance inherent in Rogers'
final imperative, we may summarize his argument in the state-
ment, "Although the behaviors of an individual are always
objectively determined by stimuli in the existential situation,
a man may, nevertheless, feel free." The point is clear
enough, but when presented in this manner there is no
paradox. No logical contradiction is implied in the state-
ment, "I feel free in spite of the fact that I know my be-
havior is determined." Such a statement merely acknowledges
that freedom and control are not mutually exclusive of each
other. It is simply another way of saying that given one set
of stimuli or circumstances, I feel one way; given another,
I feel something else. Labeling one of those feelings "free-
dom" does not create a paradox.
The paradox occurs when Rogers introduces the concept
of "will," or "self," for this constitutes the introduction
of the internal agent, and speaks to the possibility of
transcending the determining forces in the environment. Man
is free because he chooses freely, and he is responsible be-
cause he chooses freely. The problem is that freedom as
70
autonomy may be wholly incompatible with the concept of re-
sponsibility.
This possibility is suggested, first of all, by the
etymological connection that exists between the word
"responsibility" and the words "response," and "respond."
The morphological similarities in and of themselves suggest
a closeness of meaning. Taking this as a cue, we might wish
to consider how we normally use the three concepts. We might,
for instance, begin by noting that whereas "response" and
"respond" take the preposition "to," "responsibility" (and
"responsible") often take the preposition "for." Thus, we
say, "He responded to the question," or "He gave a response
to the question." We may also say, "He is responsible to
the board of directors." But our last example, though simi-
lar to the first two, carries with it some additional
meanings. For one thing, it implies that the individual in
question is assuming responsibility for something. He will
accept blame or praise for the consequences of his actions,
and, possibly, the actions of others as well. It also im-
plies that a certain group of individuals will hold him re-
sponsible for those actions . And by that we mean that their
actions will be determined by the actions of the individual
who has assumed responsibility. What is worth noting is
that the determining factors in the situation transcend time.
That is, the individual responds not only to existing and
antecedent stimuli but to those subsequent stimuli which are
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related to the expectations of the group. Furthermore, we
ought to point out, that the group need not be a group of su-
periors. They may also be a group of equals or subordinates,
or the group may be heterogeneous and relatively amorphous.
Our illustration is rather misleading in this regard.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this brief analysis.
First, responsibility does indeed entail a response, and is,
therefore, determined by certain relevant stimuli. Second-
ly, the word responsibility is generally used to identify a
particular type of response* e.g., one shaped not only by
existing and antecedent stimuli but by subsequent stimuli
as well. Insofar as this is correct, responsibility, of
necessity, entails rationality, for it is quite impossible
to transcend time in the absence of a set of appropriate
symbols
.
The view that man is autonomous, that his acts are in-
determinate, stands, of course, in direct opposition to the
view outlined above. As a polemic it has some rather ob-
vious shortcomings. First of all, it attempts to disavow
any connection between the concepts of "responsibility" and
"response," and by so doing cuts the former loose from its
context and renders it meaningless. Thus we are compelled to
ask, "In what sense can an indeterminate act also be a re-
sponsible act?" "If not to context or to other individuals,
to whom is a person responsible?" The alternatives seem to
be that one is either not responsible, or one is responsible
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to oneself. I suspect that Rogers would favor the latter.
But clearly this does not provide a way out, for, as we
pointed out in Chapter Three, the self is wrought out in
transactional experience! it is not autonomous in the sense
that it is indeterminate. If it were, it would only further
complicate matters, for we should then have to account for
the preferences of a non-contextual self. In other words,
we would simply be substituting the concept of "self" for
the concept of "will." in either case we beg the question.
As Sidney Hook has written*
Either the self has the power to mold character
or it has not. In either case it cannot be held
responsible for having or not having such a native
power. And the same is true if we bring in a Self
to explain the powers of the self and a Great Self
to explain the powers of the Self, etc. 7
I suspect that Rogers' objection to our expressed point
of view would be that if it is the case that all behavior
is determined, then how could we possibly hold anyone re-
sponsible for his actions? H. L. A, Hart, in a paper en-
titled "Legal Responsibility and Excuses," suggests that we
might find at least a partial answer in the traditions of
Anglo-American jurisprudence, particularly in what has come
to be known as the Benthamite theory. He writes*
The cases he (Bentham) lists, besides those where
the law is made ex post facto or are not ade-
quately promulgated, fall into two main classes.
The first class consists of cases in which the
penal threat of punishment could not prevent a
person from an action forbidden by the law or any
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action of _the same sort > these are the cases of in-fancy and insanity in which the agent, according to
Bentham, has not the "state or disposition of mind
on which the prospects of evils so distant as those
which are held forth by the law" has the effect of
influencing his conduct. The second class con-
sists of cases in which the law's threat could not
have had any effect on the agent in relation to the
particular act committed because of his lack of
knowledge or control. 8
Hook illustrates Bentham' s first class of cases by
noting thatt
No one blames a crawling infant who overturns a
kerosens stove that starts a fire. Almost everybody
would blame a man who, normal in every other way
and by all known tests, insures a house beyond its
value and then sets fire to it without even giving
its occupants a chance to escape. 9
The second class of cases is, however, more problematical.
Hart objects to it on the grounds that, with the exception of
those cases in the first category, it may be applied to near-
ly every case, for if the threat of punishment were effective,
no crimes would be committed. There is some question, however,
as to whether Bentham* s argument is as tautological as Hall
makes it out to be. The issue seems to revolve around the
phrase "lack of control," and this in itself suggests a mis-
understanding based on a diseased formulation. The problem
might be resolved by recasting the proposition to read* The
second class consists of cases in which the law's threat could
not have had any effect on the agent in relation to the particu
lar act committed due to the contingencies of control which
were at the time in operation. By restating the proposition
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in this way, we attenuate some of the difficulties inherent
in the evaluation of mental states. The general principle
involved, then, is whether or not it is appropriate to assume
that any "reasonable man" (i.e., one who does not fall into
the first category) might have, in the given circumstances,
acted differently than did the individual in question. The
answer, of course, may not completely exonerate an individual
—
the situation will seldom be that clear-cut—but, by acknow-
ledging the existence of mitigating circumstances, it should
prove serviceable in evaluating the degree of responsibility
t
thereby protecting both the society and the individual.
The final step that we must take, then, is to identify
those conditions which, when they are in force, absolve or
attenuate individual responsibility. We shall not, however,
limit our inquiry to the area of legal responsibility, for,
whereas the law is essentially limited to the determination
of culpability, we are equally concerned about praiseworthy
behaviors
.
In addition to infancy and insanity, we can identify at
least three other criteria which deter us from holding an
individual completely responsible for his actions. They are*
(a) coercion—including threats to one's personal safety, (b)
psychological compulsion—specifically, situations which
are so structured that no reasonable man could be expected to
act reflectively, and (c) physiological compulsion--specifi-
cally, actions resulting from certain types of severe physio-
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logical deprivation. While this list is most surely incom-
plete, I believe that it suggests two general principles
which might be applied to any additional criteria which might
come to mind. First, a man cannot be held fully responsible
for his actions when coercive contextual contingencies force
him to behave in a manner contrary to his normal behavior.
The distinguishing feature of this principle is that the
individual is forced to engage in activities which violate
his moral sensibilities. The second principle holds that a
man cannot be held fully responsible for his actions when, in
a given contextual transaction, it is unreasonable to expect
him to act reflectively. Cases of this type are characterized
by an inability to reflect. A man who murders his wife when
he discovers her in the arms of another man provides us with
one type of example, for he is generally held to be less
responsible for his actions than is one who commits pre-
meditated murder. In fact, if he is fortunate enough to live,
say, in Southern Italy, he may be totally absolved of re-
sponsibility. Kenneth Strike provides us with an illustra-
tion of a somewhat different order when he asks us to con-
sider the case of a man dying of thirst in the desert. The
man approaches a water hole marked with signs of skull and
crossbones. He drinks, of course, and dies. As Strike notes,
"the normal process of reasoning and evaluation are no longer
the determinates of behavior ."
10 Clearly one could not
reasonably expect them to be.
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Thus, coining back to the original question of how it is
possible to hold a human being responsible for actions which
are determined by contextual transactions, we may respond by
saying that a human being can be held responsible if
» (a)
he is not an infant or young child, (b) if he can be con-
sidered psychologically healthy, (c) if he has not been co-
erced into behaving in a certain way, (d) if the context would
not lead a reasonable man to act compulsively, and (e) if he
has not been subjected to severe physiological deprivation of
certain sorts. To state the matter more positively, a man
can be held responsible for his actions when there are
sufficient reasons to believe that he could have acted re-
flectively.
Freedom
. To this point we have focused our analysis on
the concept of responsibility, but it is quite evident that
our discussion of that concept has also provided us with a
serviceable definition of freedom. In other words, we have,
in effect, defined freedom in terms of responsible, reflective
behavior. This, it seems to me, constitutes a definition
based not on choice but on the power to act. That is, on the
ability to act in terms of the relationship which exists be-
tween antecedent, existing, and subsequent experience. It
is this ability which frees a man from the necessity of acting
in terms of immediate impulse, and protects him from being a
slave to the moment. Such a condition demands the utilization
of a public system of symbols to carry the meaning of ex-
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perience and to make it continuous. The alternative is that
behavior is "unpredictable, " "spontaneous," "capricious,"
and "uncaused." As Strike suggests!
Not all of these are especially complimentary de-
scriptions of a person or an act. To call a person
unpredictable or capricious may be to impugn his
reliability or to note his unstable character. To
describe someone as spontanous may be to say that
(in the popular jargon) he does not have a lot of
hangups, but it may also be to suggest that his
behavior lacks some degree of self control. More
pointedly, we do not think of a person whose be-
havior is capricious, unpredictable, unstable or
lacking self control as particularly free. Such
traits often are indicative of some underlying
psychological problem, and having psychological
problems is, of course, one way of failing to be
free. 11
Strike's remarks shed a good deal of light on Rogerian
theory and practice, for, typically, Rogers' clients do not
evidence the traits that Strike is concerned with; rather,
they illustrate a problem of the opposite sort. They are
characterized by their inability to escape certain subtlely
coercive contingencies. It is, therefore, Rogers' intention
to remove or alleviate some of the pressure so that his clients
might begin to act in terms of their experience. To the ex-
tent that this is the case, his practice is consistent with
the notion that freedom entails responsibility; but he
appears to move beyond this point by reasoning that if ex-
ternal control is psychologically debilitating then the absence
of control is psychologically beneficial. Such reasoning
clearly fails to distinguish between types of control, and
leads to the attractive, but wholly untenable, posture that a
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healthy man is the master of his own behavior. This, in turn,
leads to the romantic proposition that a healthy man is
responsible for his health; whereas, the unhealthy man is
a victim of his environment.
With these observations in mind, it becomes fairly ob-
vious why Rogers rejects traditional educational practices.
In particular, it accounts for his rejection of the practice
of teaching, for teaching, as Rogers sees it and defines it,
constitutes an attempt to control and thereby "causes the
individual to distrust his own experience, and to stifle
significant learning." This view, coupled with the
argument that "human beings have a natural potentiality for
learning," seems to culminate in the argument that an in-
dividual learns best and most when left to his own interests
and devices. It is noteworthy that Rogers makes no attempt,
as did Dewey, to distinguish between educative and misedu-
cative experiences. The valid proposition that young children
are inquisitive is not counterbalanced by the proposition
that they are also extremely eclectic and inconstant in their
mode of inquiry. These factors Rogers conveniently overlooks;
but this topic is properly the subject of the next chapter and
we shall postpone any additional comments until then. For
the moment it is sufficient to note that many of Rogers' more
extreme educational views are predicated on certain stipulated
conceptual definitions, and they can be maintained only to the
extent that the definitions are themselves tenable. This
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chapter
,
as well as the two which preceded it, have attempted
to demonstrate that at least three of Rogers' fundamental
concepts suffer from severely diseased formulations.
Summary
. In his writings, Carl Rogers stipulates a
definition of freedom which is predicated on a basic trust
in the human organism, and it is this trust which leads him
to conclude that only a free man f a man unimpeded by external
control, can be a responsible man. At the same time, however,
Rogers is forced to admit that advances in the behavioral
sciences tend to suggest that human beings are always sub-
ject to controlling forces in the environment. To resolve
this dilemma, Rogers attempts to fashion the two conflicting
viewpoints into a paradox, thereby affording himself the
luxury of living amicably with two contradictory arguments.
Our purpose, then, was twofold. Initially, we attempted
to point out that the contradiction in question is the re-
sult of a poorly conceptualized definition; that, in effect
the definition fosters many more difficulties than it solves.
Secondly, we suggested that there is no need for the "para-
dox” inasmuch as all of Rogers' concerns can be adequately
met by a deterministic conception of freedom. This, we
pointed out, can be accomplished through a careful analysis
of the relationship which obtains between freedom and re-
sponsibility. Moreover, it was suggested that when freedom
is regarded as a function of responsibility, concern shifts
to a consideration of those controls which permit men to
feel free, as opposed to those which do not. There does
not appear to be any logical reason why Rogers should not
or could not accept such a shift.
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CHAPTER V
EDUCATION
In this concluding chapter we turn our attention to
Carl Rogers* educational theory as set down in his book
Freedom to Learn , In particular, we shall focus on the re-
lationships between the concepts analyzed in the previous
chapters, and several of Rogers* more important educational
concepts. To this end, four new terms will be introduced!
"learning," "teaching," "commitment," and "the fully function-
ing person." A general assessment of Rogers' position con-
cludes the work.
Learning . Above all else Freedom to Learn is a book
about learning. "But not," writes Rogers, "the lifeless,
sterile, futile, quickly forgotten stuff which is crammed
into the mind of the poor helpless individual tied into his
seat by ironclad bonds of conformity!"^ Rather, he is in-
terested in that which he refers to as "self-discovered," or
"self-appropriated learning." He writes*
I am talking about LEARNING--the insatiable curiosity
which drives the adolescent boy to absorb everything
he can see or hear or read about gasoline engines in
order to improve the efficiency and speed of his
"hotrod." I am talking about the student who says,
"I am discovering, drawing in from the outside, and
making that which is drawn in a real part; of me."
I am talking about any learning in which the exper-
ience of the learner progresses along this line*
"No, no, that's not what I want"? "Ah, here it is!
Now I'm grasping and comprehending what I need and
what I want to know!" This is the theme, the topic,
of this book. 2
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The point is obvious enough. Essentially, Rogers is simply
saying that learning can be meaningless or meaningful to an
individual, but that only the latter will result in signifi-
cant changes in behavior. The latter comes about through
self-motivated discovery. Actually, we can be even more
emphatic j from the first statement we may infer that learning
which is imposed from without--the ''quickly forgotten stuff
cannot result in significant behavioral changes. This argu-
ment is made explicit in the now famous Rogerian dictum "any-
thing that can be taught to another is relatively inconse-
quential and has little or no significant influence on be-
havior."^ From the second statement we can draw the inference
that individuals learn best when left alone. Of this he
writes
»
Whv is it that left to his own devices the child
learns rapidly, in ways he will not soon forget,
and in a manner which has highly practical meaning
for him, when all of this can be spoiled if
he is "taught" in a way which involves only
his
intellect? 4
Thus, he goes on to say that "the only
learning which signi-
ficantly influences behavior is self-discovered,
self-«ppro-
5
priated learning."
This latter argument bears a marked,
though superficial,
resemblance to John Dewey's argument that
all learning is a
function of interest. It is only when
we begin to consider
the disparity of their conclusions,
that we begin to compre-
hend that something is amiss. Dewey
would most assuredly
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reject the premise that we ought to do away with teaching,
and certainly he would not agree that anything which can be
taught will have no significant influence on behavior. It
does not seem likely that the two authors would reach wholly
different conclusions from like premises. If we probe more
deeply into the matter, we discover that when Dewey speaks of
"interest" he does not refer to anything which is located
in the organism. Rather, he views it as a function of trans-
actions which take place between the organism and the en-
vironment. He writes in Democracy and Education !
Life activities flourish and fail only in con-
nection with changes in the environment. They
are literally bound up with these changes; our
desires, emotions, and affections are but var-
ious ways in which doings are tied up with the
doings of things and persons about us. Instead
of marking a purely personal or subjective realm,
separated from the objective and impersonal they
indicate the non-existence of such a separate
world. They afford convincing evidence that
changes in things are not alien to the activities
of a self, and that the career and welfare of the
self are bound up with the movement of persons and
things. Interest, concern, mean that self and world
are engaged with each other in a developing situa-
tion. 6
The point is that interest or insatiable curiosity
do not constitute a drawing in from outside. For, when
viewed in this way, interest "is taken to mean merely the
effect of an object upon personal advantage or disadvantage,
success or failure. Separated from any objective develop-
ment of affairs, these are reduced to mere personal states of
7pleasure or pain."
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In light of Dewey's observations it is evident that
Rogers' position is unnecessarily dualistic. The problem
^*0^ Rogers, then, is to get that which is outside the learner
inside the learner. Teaching does not seem to be able to
do this because as Rogers points out you cannot communicate
direct experience. Furthermore, the "inside/outside" dis-
tinction only serves to perpetuate the belief that subject
matter can be of no particular interest to the learner. As
a consequence, three conclusions are possible: (a) education
must be coercive if children are to learn, or (b) it must be
of the "soup kitchen" variety, making use of games and play
to accomplish the same end, or (c) one might conclude, as
does Rogers, that whatever one does is bound to fail. All
three views are equally irresponsible, for they fail to see
their way through to the real problem, that teaching cannot
succeed when teachers themselves are unable to justify that
which they teach. What teacher has not been nonplussed at
one time or another by the question "Why are we doing this?"
If teaching too often fails, perhaps it is because it is too
often mindless.
Rogers obviously will not come to appreciate this prob-
lem, for he has constructed for himself a problem of a
different sort. As a result, all that is left to him is
a theory of learning based on personal need, and, having
come to this conclusion, it follows that the learner must
be in the best position to decide what he ought to learn,
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and how he ought to learn it.
The main objection to this argument is that it may be
extremely unwise to leave such an important decision to a
single individual, particularly when other interested parties
are involved. It is not the case after all that education
exists merely to serve the needs of individuals. There is
always a context to be considered, and the more complicated
and fluid the context the more important it becomes to take
it into consideration. Unfortunately, the learner is not
always in the best position to do this, and so, the schools
must assist him in assessing his role in the context of
community and culture. The alternative of leaving the entire
matter up to the learner, regardless of how self-directed
he may be, suggests a lack of appreciation and understanding
of the distinction between learning and education. Rogers*
position is somewhat less extreme, however, and is predicated
on a belief in man's potential for positive growth. He as-
sumes that, given the proper environment, the individual
will quite naturally develop the appropriate social con-
cerns and interests. The argument is clearly both taut-
ological and simplistic. In any event, the argument is
not entirely convincing, for while it may be true that
the results of self-directed learning are often impressive,
g
they are just as often not very reassuring. Rogers
faith in human nature blinds him to the fact that sub-
jective evaluation may yield widely varying results.
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In order to illustrate our argument, we might turn
our attention to the Elizabeth Cleaners Street School in
New York City, a unique school run by students who dropped
out of the New York Public School System* These students,
from what might be colloquially labelled "well-to-do"
families, are an incredibly sophisticated, and astutely
critical group of young peopls. It is, therefore, all the
more frightening to find some of the following observations
in their discussion of the school.
\
Lisa (age 15)* It's us that's doing the learn-
ing, and we know what we're interested in.
And it's not true anymore that teachers know
better. Nobody can know what's important
to you
• 9
When asked to delineate those things which she felt were
important, Lisa replied*
Lisa * Well, you know relevant is a very over-used
word. But you know, things that are relevant.
Like everybody's interested in Cuba, right?
So instead of everybody learning about India
for a year, you learn about Cuba. And you find
out what's going on in terms of the Venceremos
Brigade, things like that. It really relates
to you. 10
Lisa's comments about relevance remind us of McCracken's
story of the freshman who didn't want to study the irrele-
vant Greeks. "What she wanted to study was the American
Indians, who lived with nature, rather than against it, an
altogether more promising lifestyle."
11
Lisa, who is very vocal in the interview also makes
the following comment on the hiring of teachers*
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Lisai All the teachers we hired have the same kind
of personality. They all like Chinese cooking,
they all know urban problems, they're all into
art and photography and pottery and things like
that, and things like ecology and Cuba. 12
Although Lisa is the most vocal of the group, the
general discussion always seems to revolve around personal
needs. In fact, when one of the students is asked about
her vision of adult society—what it ought to be like—she
comments *
Vashti (age 13) « People won't have a job and a
certain role in life. You do what you're in-
terested in, I guess it's something like school.
Everyone helps each other. And money isn't the
main thing in everyone's life. There will be
other things. 13
For Vashti, then, the ideal society is one in which
everyone does what he's interested in; there are no fixed
roles, no fixed responsibilities. Everybody helps every-
body else because everybody is good. The reader cannot help
but see how close this view comes to the Rogerian ideal.
Unfortunately, the same children who possess this ideal also
see the present culture as a "system," and, of course,
systems are made to be beaten.
Is the Elizabeth Cleaners Street School representative
of the type of school which would receive Rogers' approval?
It ought to. It is a school run by learners; its teachers
acquiesce to students on the questions of what ought to be
learned—or, at least, they are screened to make certain
that they conform to student specifications. Educational
89
direction is a function of interest and personal need, and
all learning takes place in a climate of freedom.
Is it possible that Rogers would have no misgivings
about such a school? Shouldn’t he be concerned that all of
its teachers were selected because of their similar person-
alities? Shouldn’t he be troubled that the school serves
as a shelter, isolating its students from serious social
problems? And what of the fact that no child in the inter-
view demonstrates any understanding or compassion for the
culture in which he lives? Shouldn't Rogers be concerned
about all of these things?
Perhaps he would be, but his writings do not reflect
any such concern; rather, he falls back on the naive be-
lief that when the individual is free to pursue his own
interests, he will naturally develop an interest in en-
vironmental and social problems. He writes*
We do not need to ask who will socialize him, for
one of his own deepest needs is for affiliation
with and communication with others. When he is
fully himself, he cannot help but be realistically
socialized. 14
It is not altogether clear how Rogers would justify
this argument, and there does not appear to be a great deal
of historical evidence to support it. We could just as
easily argue that a man is most fully himself when he is
realistically socialized. Both points of view are clearly
tautological. In any event, are we to uncritically accept
the premise that man's need for affiliation and communica-
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"tion provide sufficient; reason "to believe "that; he is naturally
equipped to deal with complex social issues? It seems rather
simplistic to argue that our most pressing social problems
will be resolved because we have a deep-felt need to resolve
them. The complex problems which presently concern us
promise to become even more complex and more firmly entrenched
if we do not at once begin to cultivate the skills to cope
with them. We already have the need to solve our ecological
problems, for example, but beyond that the problem itself
requires that we have a thorough understanding of its histori-
cal roots, its present and future implications. Information,
then, becomes as necessary a requisite as need. It is not
the case, as Rogers suggests, that all information is "quick-
ly forgotten stuff." When social problems are neglected the
line between "doing your own thing" and exploitive "laissez
faire" liberalism is indeed a fine one.
It is precisely here that we begin to see the negative
implications of an educational theory built upon a capricious
subjectivism. What is all too easily lost in Rogers' con-
ceptions of "knowing," "self," and "freedom" is social con-
sciousness. And, when that is lost, culture ceases to be a
means whereby the individual can grow and develop, and be-
comes instead an adversary force which seeks to stamp out
individual initiative and happiness. It is somewhat ironic
that an intelligent man like Rogers can have so much faith
in the individual and so little in the institutions which
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he has created.
Perhaps the most important point that we can make, how-
ever, is that Rogers has convincingly demonstrated that a
theory of learning is not, of necessity, a theory of educa-
tion. To get from learning to education one must move beyond
subjective needs and personal desires to a consideration of
intersub j ective needs and desires in the form of macro-social
transactions. That is, to transactions which extend beyond
the family, the school, the office; beyond encounter groups
and therapy sessions to a concern for all of the individuals
who are caught up in the business of living in the world.
Such transactions might include common concerns for the
quality of life in a society which is overburdened with prob-
lems of technology, ecology, economics, population, and civil
rights. It is unlikely that such problems will be solved by
educational dilettantes, flitting from one personal interest
to another; and, even if it is true that individuals are
possessed of a natural potentiality for learning, it is
quite apparent that they are not possessed of a natural po-
tentiality for disciplined inquiry.
That Rogers equates learning with education only
serves to cast a shadow of doubt over much of what he has to
say. His failure to recognize that some learnings inhibit
growth and stifle subsequent inquiry is in itself sufficient
cause to dismiss him as an educational theorist.
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Teaching
. As has already been noted, Rogers* position
on teaching may be precisely summarized in the statement, "I
have come to feel that the outcomes of teaching are either
unimportant or hurtful." 1 ^ Nonetheless, what Rogers means
by this, and how he comes to it, is of considerable interest.
Initially, we ought to consider what the term "teaching"
means to Rogers. He writes in a rather revealing passage*
I wish to begin this chapter with a statement which
may seem surprising to some and perhaps offensive
to others. It is simply this* Teaching, in
my estimation, is a vastly over-rated function.
Having made such a statement, I scurry to the
dictionary to see if I really mean what I say.
Teaching means 'to instruct.' Personally I am
not much interested in instructing another in what
he should know or think. 'To impart knowledge or
skill.' My reaction is, why not be more efficient,
using a book or programmed learning? 'To make to
know.' Here my hackles rise. I have no wish to
make anyone know something. 'To show, guide, direct.'
As I see it, too many people have been shown, guided,
directed. So I come to the conclusion that I do.
mean what I said. Teaching is, for me, a relatively
unimportant and vastly overvalued activity. 16
It's rather surprising that an author writing a
book on education should consult a dictionary for a
definition of teaching. Given the importance of the
concept, more appropriate sources are certainly available.
Of philosophic significance is the fact that dictionary
definitions are often trivial and circular. We do not,
for example, learn very much when we discover that one
of the meanings of the phrase "to teach" is "to instruct,"
because when we look up the latter term we find it
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defined in terms of the former.
In any event, having completed his research of the sub-
ject, Rogers goes on to sayi
Teaching and the imparting of knowledge make sensein an unchanging environment. This is why it hasbeen an unquestioned function for centuries. Butif there is one truth about modern man, it is thathe lives in an environment which is continually
changing. The one thing I can be sure of is that
the physics which is taught to the present day
student will be outdated in a decade. The teachingin psychology will certainly be out of date in 20
years. 17
In spite of Rogers* concluding dictum, my friends in
the physical sciences inform me that Newton and Boyle are
still very much with us, and, for that matter, so is
Freud
—
possibly much to Rogers* chagrin. But of greater
import is the fact that having settled on a definition of
teaching, Rogers then proceeds to ignore that part of it
which does not suit his purpose. According to his original
definition, teaching entails not only the imparting of know-
ledge but the imparting of skills as well. Rogers convenient-
ly omits the latter meaning because it does considerable dam-
age to his argument. How could he deny, for example, that
individuals in a rapidly changing society are in dire need
of a great variety of highly specialized skills? Of particu-
lar importance in this regard is the skill of systematic in-
quiry, itself. In fact, it is evident that the need for
skills in this area increases in direct proportion to the
rate of change. It is the stable society, the fixed society,
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which can make do with tradition and convention! however, a
rapidly changing society demands that its members have the
necessary skills not only to live with change but to both
foresee it and plan it.
Elsewhere Rogers implies that teaching may be character-
ized as any activity which "seems to cause the individual
to distrust his own experience, and to stifle significant
1 8learning." This definition, though vague, is much more
to the point, for, in effect, it argues that too often we
expect students to accept our point of view simply because
we feel that we are wiser than they are. Rogers, however,
defines the term in such a way that only activities which
lead the individual to distrust his own experience can be
properly labeled teaching. This is clearly the case, for
in his guidelines for "facilitation"—the concept which he
substitutes for teaching--he says, "He (the facilitator)
makes himself available as a counselor, lecturer, and ad-
visor, a person with experience in the field." 7 In other
words the facilitator may do the same things that the teach-
er does, but when he does it, it is not teaching. The
essential distinction appears to be that the facilitator only
does these things when asked to do so by the learner. The
learner sets his own goals, identifies his own interests.
The distinction between teacher and facilitator is so
clear-cut that it blurs all of the other alternatives. In
particular, it fails to note that some teachers, the very good
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ones, are capable of developing interests in their students.
Such teachers are neither coercive nor overly permissive;
rather, they temper compassion and understanding with good
judgement. They demonstrate concern not only for the learner,
but for subject matter and context as well. By ignoring the
good teacher, Rogers becomes a victim of his own philosophy,
leaving open to himself only two alternatives, both of which
are ultimately predicated on the proposition that the inner
world of the learner cannot be breached by other individuals.
It is worth noting, in this regard, that whereas Rogers can
say at one point that "truth that has been personally appro-
priated and assimilated in experience, cannot be directly com-
municated to another;" he can also say, just a few para-
graphs later, that "I find that one of the best, but most
difficult ways for me to learn is to drop my own defensiveness,
at least temporarily, and to try to understand the way in
which his experience seems and feels to the other person ." 21
Can these two statements be reconciled? The latter certainly
appears to contradict many of Rogers* theoretical objections
to teaching.
Commitment. Commitment is a linking concept in Rogers*
work—a bridge between the concept of freedom and the con-
cepts that we have been discussing. It is defined as follows:
Commitment is a total organismic direction involving
not only the conscious mind but the whole direction
of the organism as well.
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In my judgment, commitment is something that onediscovers within oneself. It is a trust of one's
total reaction rather than of one's mind only. 22
He goes on to say*
Thus commitment is more than a decision. It is
the functioning of an individual who is searching
for the directions which are emerging within him-
self. 23
The similarity between this last statement and the follow-
ing statement on learning is well worth noting.
It (learning) has a quality of personal involvement—
the whole person in both his feelings and cognitive
aspects being in the learning event. 24
Rogers' definition of commitment reinforces our earlier
observation that his conception of learning is predicated on
a fundamental dualism—a distinction between that which is
within the individual and that which is without. It is
this dualism which leads to the positing of the autonomous,
self-guiding organism. From this self-guiding being flows
commitment, and, in turn, significant learning.
We have already voiced our objections to Rogers*
conceptions of freedom and self, and many of them could be
extended to cover this concept as well. We may note, for
example, that etymologically commitment means "to bring to-
gether," and indeed we do normally employ the word when we
wish to suggest that a certain type of relationship exists
between two things. That relationship is always characterized
by activity, and the quality of that activity is always of
one particular sort. It is both intense and sustained. It
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is a function of an individual's total emersion in a particu-
lar transactional milieu. To say, for example, that someone
is committed to a cause is to suggest a type of relationship
which extends beyond mere support; rather, it suggests that
that individual has established an intense common bond with
others who are working toward like ends and purposes. In
fact, the ends as purposes serve as the bond which holds
the group together. Even when the cause in question seems
to be of a private nature, there is always a bond between the
individual and the context of inquiry. It is only when
this bond is ignored or neglected that commitment appears
to be located within the individual. But to so locate it is
to violate the very meaning of the word.
In somewhat of an aside, we can also point out that
while we often use the phrase "to commit" in reference to an
individual’s "voluntary" commitment to a cause, we also em-
ploy it to refer to the act of placing someone in custody
Thus, I may be committed to a political candidate, or I may
be committed to a prison. In either case our definition of
commitment as transactional emersion holds. What is at
variance is the nature of the bond involved. In the first
case the bond is a link of common purposes which brings me
into a transactional arrangement with a political candidate;
whereas in the latter I am forcefully committed to a transaction
the bond becomes bondage—and my commitment is coerced.
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In education the same argument can be applied. Our
schools can serve to coerce commitment, or to develop it
through the cultivation of interests, attitudes, and values
based on a more symbiotic transactional bond. When, however,
we place commitment wholly within the province of the organism,
the second alternative ceases to be possible except by chance.
The problem with autonomous, self-guided men is that they
are not easily moved by outside forces--be they good or evil.
2M gully Functioning Person . The goal of both therapy
and education, says Rogers, ought to be a person whoi (a)
is open to his experience ,^ (b) lives in an existential
2 6fashion, and (c) finds that he can trust his organism to
arrive at the most satisfying behavior in each situation. 2
"^
Of the first characteristic, Rogers writes
i
In the person who is open to his experience...
every stimulus, whether originating within the
organism or in the environment, would be freely
relayed through the nervous system without being
distorted by a defense mechanism. . .whether the
stimulus was the impact of a configuration of
form, color, or sound in the environment on the
sensory nerves, or a memory trace from the past,
or a visceral sensation of fear or pleasure or
disgust, the person would be ’living it,
’
would
having it completely available to awareness. 28
It would be absurd to argue that openness to ex-
perience ought not to be one of the goals of education, but
we might raise some questions about what that goal actually
entails. Rogers' comments on this point cannot be taken
lightly. We may inquire, however, whether it would actually
be to an individual's benefit to somehow eliminate all
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defensiveness? Is it not the case that bodily defense
mechanisms serve to protect the organism from excessive
stimulation? For example, the pupil contracts to protect the
organism from an excessive amount of light* or, to cite a
more extreme example, the body goes into shock to protect
certain organs from intense pain# I do not know the answer
to these questions, but if they raise a valid point, would it
not then be the case that a person free of defensiveness is
actually in any better shape than someone else who was over-
burdened by it? Perhaps to truly trust our organism, we
must also trust its defense mechanisms.
On the second point Rogers saysi
I believe it would be evident that for the
person who was fully open to his experience,
completely without defensiveness, each moment
would be new# The complex configuration of
inner and outer stimuli which exists in this
moment has never existed before in just this
fashion. 29
The personality and the self would be con-
tinually in flux, the only stable elements being
the physiological capacities and limitations of
the organism, the recurrent organismic needs fcr
survival, enhancement, food, affection, sex, and
the like. The most stable personality traits
would be openness to experience, and the flexible
resolution of the existing needs in the existing
environment. 30
Throughout this study we have argued that the edu-
cated, the rational, the reflective person is one whose
behaviors are predicated on an appreciation and under-
standing of the continuity of experience. He does not be-
have capriciously or impulsively, but considers his actions
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in terms of their causal history, the immediate context, and
their consequences. He is. open to his experience, but that
experience is an instrument or means whereby he can secure
for himself not only immediate happiness and well-being, but
continuous happiness and well-being. In a society burdened
by the consequences of poor planning, it seems absurd to
argue that we ought to educate the young to live in the
moment. More than ever before we need people who can see
in the moment the possibilities for the future.
On the third, and final, characteristic of the fully
functioning person Rogers has this to say*
Since he (the fully functioning person) is open
to his experience, all of the data from his sense
impressions, from his memory, from previous learn-
ing, from his visceral and internal states, is fed
into the machine. The machine takes all of these
multidud.inous pulls and forces which were fed in
as data, and quickly computes the course of action
which would be the most economical avenue of need
satisfaction in this existential situation. 31
(As an aside, it is interesting to note the machine
analogy which Rogers makes use of in this quote.
One of his common objections to Behaviorism has
been the fact that it objectifies man and treats
him as though he were a machine.)
This statement may be understood as a reply to our last
objection. That is, we need not fear for the future because
when we are open to our experience, our internal gyro-compass
will see us through the most difficult times and problems.
This view, indeed, must be the epitome of the romantic vision,
the ultimate concession to sentimental oversimplification.
Though it sounds scientific, in the end a trust in the
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organism is a "trust; in intuition, and if i"t works as Rogers
believes then there is no need for education at all—with
the possible exception of education as therapy.
The idea that education ought to strive to produce
people who are fully capable of functioning in the world
is most appropriate. But Rogers' definition of such a per-
son all but precludes the possibility of attaining that goal
through education. If we cannot teach a person how to
function in the world, if we cannot even guide him, then,
what purpose can education serve?
Conclusions
. If we seriously wish to consider this
last question, we must, I believe, conclude that Carl Rogers
does not provide his readers with a theory of education.
In fact, there is every reason to believe that Rogers' con-
ceptions of "freedom," "self," and "knowing" stand as
philosophical barricades to the positing of such a theory.
By isolating the individual from the world education becomes
impossible, or, at best, it becomes a slave to happenstance,
flaring up in response to personal fancies and momentary needs.
But, above all else, Rogers is most vulnerable when we
look to his writings to gain insight into the social purposes
of education. There is in Freedom to Learn a total disregard
for culture, and for the institutions of men. It demonstrates
no love, or understanding, or even acknowledgment of the rich
diversity of culture, and says not a word about the problems
which confront it.
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It is true, as Rogers says, that education must pre-
pare people for change, and assist them to function in a
world that is presently difficult to imagine. But education
must also work to create that world, and this it can do
only by imparting to young people those skills which seem
most promising at present. Most importantly, it must teach
the skills of open and free inquiry. For these are the
skills which enable people to escape the press of immediate
needs, and view problems in the context of continuous ex-
perience.
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